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In this dissertation, we consider the design of broadcast and secure multi-party
computation (MPC) protocols in the presence of adversarial faults.
Secure multi-party computation is the most generic problem in fault-tolerant
distributed computing. In principle, a multi-party computation protocol can be
used to solve any distributed cryptographic problem. Informally, the problem of
multi-party computation is the following: suppose we have n parties P1, P2, . . . , Pn
where each party Pi has a private input xi. Together, the parties want to compute
a function of their inputs (y1, y2, . . . , yn) = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn). However, some parties
can be corrupted and do not execute a prescribed protocol faithfully. Even worse,
they may be controlled by an adversary and attack the protocol in a coordinated
manner. Despite the presence of such an adversary, a secure MPC protocol should
ensure that each (corrupted) party Pi learn only its output yi but nothing more.
Broadcast in the presence of adversarial faults is one of the simplest special
cases of multi-party computation and important component of larger protocols. In
short, broadcast allows a party to send the same message to all parties, and all
parties to be assured they have received identical messages.
The contribution of this dissertation is twofold. First, we construct broadcast
and secure multi-party computation protocols for honest majority in a point-to-point
network whose round complexities improve significantly upon prior work. In par-
ticular, we give the first expected constant-round authenticated broadcast protocol
for honest majority assuming only public-key infrastructure and signatures. Second,
we initiate the study of broadcast in radio networks in the presence of adversarial
faults. In radio networks, parties communicate through multicasting messages; a
message can only be received by the parties within some radius from the sender.
Feasibility and impossibility results are given, and our bounds are tight.
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In this dissertation, we consider the design of broadcast and secure multi-party
computation (MPC) protocols in the presence of adversarial faults.
Secure multi-party computation is the most generic problem in fault-tolerant
distributed computing. In principle, a multi-party computation protocol can be
used to solve any distributed cryptographic problem. Informally, the problem of
multi-party computation is the following: suppose we have n parties P1, P2, . . . , Pn
where each party Pi has an input xi. Together, the parties want to compute a
function of their inputs (y1, y2, . . . , yn) = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn). However, some parties
are corrupted and malicious. These corrupted parties may not execute a prescribed
protocol faithfully. Even worse, they may be controlled by an adversary and attack
the protocol in a coordinated manner. Despite the presence of such an adversary,
a secure MPC protocol should ensure that each (corrupted) party Pi learn only yi
but nothing more.
Broadcast in the presence of adversarial faults is one of the simplest special
cases of multi-party computation. In short, broadcast allows a party to send the
same message to all parties. It is a useful building block for MPC protocols and
other distributed cryptographic protocols. More formally, the broadcast problem
can be stated as follows: there is a distinguished party, known as the dealer, who
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holds a message m. However, some parties (including the dealer) can be corrupted
by an adversary. Despite this, all honest (i.e., uncorrupted) parties should eventually
output a common message m′. In addition, if the dealer is honest, then m′ should
be equal to m.
In this dissertation, we consider two different kinds of communication models:
point-to-point networks and radio networks. In point-to-point networks, all pairs of
parties communicate through direct links. On the other hand, in radio networks,
parties communicate through a wireless channel. Two parties can communicate
directly only if they are within the transmission range of each other. Furthermore,
every party in the range hears the message being transmitted.
This dissertation is divided into two parts. In the first part, we study the
round efficiency of broadcast and secure multi-party computation protocols in point-
to-point networks under the standard model from the literature. In the second part,
we propose an adversarial model for corruption of parties in radio networks and
study the feasibility of broadcast under this model.
Preliminary version of the work in this dissertation appeared in [KK06, KK07,
Koo04, KBKV06].
1.1 Part One: Round-Efficient Protocols in Point-to-Point
Networks
The round complexity of cryptographic protocols has been the subject of
intense study. Much work has been done on establishing bounds on the round
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complexity of various tasks such as zero knowledge [BCY89, FS89, GK96, BJY97,
HT98, Ros00, CKPR01, PRS02], broadcast (Byzantine agreement) [PSL80, LSP82,
FL82, DS83, Bra87, CC85, FM85, DSS90, BG93, MW94, FM97, GM98, BB98,
BE03], verifiable secret sharing [GIKR01, FGG+06], and secure multi-party compu-
tation [Yao86, BMR90, IK00, GIKR02, KOS03, Lin03, KO04, DI05].
Apart from the fact that these results are of fundamental theoretical impor-
tance, reducing the round complexity of existing protocols is crucial if we ever hope
to use these protocols in the real world. If the best known protocol for a given task
requires hundreds of rounds, it will never be used; on the other hand, if we know (in
principle) that round-efficient solutions are possible, we can then turn our attention
to improving other aspects (such as computation) in an effort to obtain a protocol
that can be used in practice.
In this part, we focus on constructing round-efficient protocols for broadcast
and secure multi-party computation in synchronous point-to-point networks in the
presence of honest majority, i.e., at least half of the parties are honest. In a syn-
chronous network, an execution of protocol takes place in rounds. In each round,
parties send messages to each other depending on the messages they have received
from the previous rounds; the parties also receive the messages being sent to them
within the same round.
3
1.1.1 Broadcast
When designing cryptographic protocols, it is often convenient to abstract
away various details of the underlying communication network. As one noteworthy
example, it is often convenient to assume the existence of a broadcast channel which
allows any party to send the same message to all other parties (and all parties to be
assured they have received identical messages) in a single round. In most cases, it
is understood that the protocol will be run in a network where only point-to-point
communication is available and the parties will have to “emulate” the broadcast
channel by running a broadcast protocol. Unfortunately, this “emulation” typically
increases the round complexity of the protocol substantially.
Work has been done on reducing the round complexity of protocols for broad-
cast or the related task of Byzantine agreement (BA) [PSL80, LSP82]. In Byzantine
agreement, each party has an initial input. Eventually, all parties have to output a
common value. The requirement is that if all (honest) parties have the same input
value, then the parties have to output that particular value. In the case of honest
majority, any Byzantine agreement protocol implies a broadcast protocol using one
additional round (in the first round the sender sends its message to all parties, who
then run a Byzantine agreement protocol on the values they received). Note that
Byzantine agreement is not defined if there is an absence of honest majority.
Related Work. The Byzantine agreement problem is introduced by Pease, Shostak
and Lamport [PSL80, LSP82] who show that in a synchronous network with pairwise
authenticated channels and no additional set-up assumptions, BA among n parties
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is achievable if and only if the number of corrupted parties t satisfies t < n/3.
Concerning round complexity, a lower bound of t + 1 rounds for any deterministic
BA protocol is known in this setting [FL82]. A protocol with this round complexity
— but with exponential message complexity — was shown by Pease, et al. [PSL80,
LSP82]. Following a long sequence of works, Garay and Moses [GM98] show a
fully-polynomial BA protocol with optimal resilience and round complexity.
To circumvent the above-mentioned lower bound, researchers beginning with
Rabin [Rab83] and Ben-Or [B83] explored the use of randomization to obtain better
round complexity. This line of research [Bra87, CC85, FM85, DSS90] culminated
in the work of Feldman and Micali [FM97], who show a randomized BA protocol
with optimal resilience t < n/3 that runs in an expected constant number of rounds.
Their protocol requires channels to be both private and authenticated.
To achieve resilience t ≥ n/3, additional assumptions are needed even if ran-
domization is used [KY]. The most widely-used assumptions are the existence of
digital signatures and a public-key infrastructure (PKI); protocols in this setting
are termed authenticated. Implicit in this setting is that the adversary cannot forge
signatures. Pease, et al. [PSL80, LSP82] show an authenticated broadcast protocol
for t < n, and a fully-polynomial protocol achieving this resilience was given by
Dolev and Strong [DS83]. These works rely only on the existence of digital sig-
nature schemes and a PKI, and do not require private channels. Digital signature
schemes can be constructed from one-way functions [NY89, Rom90]; however, the
schemes will only be secure against a computationally bounded adversary; alterna-
tively, if information-theoretic “pseudo-signatures” [PW96] are used, security can
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be obtained even against an unbounded adversary.
The (t+1)-round lower bound for deterministic protocols holds in the authen-
ticated setting as well [DS83], and the protocols of [PSL80, LSP82, DS83] meet this
bound. Some randomized protocols beating this bound for the case of n/3 ≤ t < n/2
are known [Tou84, Bra87, Wai91], but these are only partial results:
• Toueg [Tou84] gives an expected O(1)-round protocol, but assumes a trusted
dealer. After the dealing phase the parties can only run the BA protocol a
bounded number of times.
• A protocol by Bracha [Bra87] implicitly requires a trusted dealer to ensure that
parties agree on a “Bracha assignment” in advance (see [FM85]). Furthermore,
the protocol only achieves expected round complexity Θ(log n) and tolerates
(slightly sub-optimal) t ≤ n/(2 + ǫ) for any ǫ > 0.
• Waidner [Wai91], building on [Bra87, FM85], shows that the dealer in Bracha’s
protocol can be replaced by an Ω(t)-round pre-processing phase during which
a broadcast channel is assumed. The expected round complexity (after the
pre-processing) is also improved from Θ(log n) to Θ(1).
The latter two results assume private channels.
Fitzi and Garay [FG03], building on [Tou84, CKS00, Nie02], give the first full
solution to this problem: that is, they show the first authenticated BA protocol
with optimal resilience t < n/2 and expected constant round complexity that does
not require any trusted dealer or pre-processing (other than a PKI). Even assuming
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private channels, however, their protocol requires specific number-theoretic assump-
tions (essentially, some appropriately-homomorphic public-key encryption scheme)
and cannot be based on signatures alone. Because of its reliance on additional as-
sumptions, the Fitzi-Garay protocol cannot be adapted to the information-theoretic
setting using pseudo-signatures.
Our Contributions
As our main result, in Chapter 3, we extend the work of Feldman and Micali
and show that:
Theorem 1.1.1 Assuming a public-key infrastructure and the existence of signa-
ture schemes, there exists a broadcast protocol tolerating t < n/2 malicious parties
running in expected constant rounds.
For those unfamiliar with the specifics of the Feldman-Micali protocol, we
stress that their approach does not readily extend to the case of t < n/2. In
particular, they rely on a primitive termed graded VSS and construct this primitive
using in an essential way the fact that t < n/3. We take a different approach: we
introduce a new primitive called moderated VSS (mVSS) and use this to give an
entirely self-contained proof of our result.
We suggest that mVSS is a useful alternative to graded VSS in general, even
when t < n/3. For one, mVSS seems easier to construct: we show a generic con-
struction of mVSS in the point-to-point model from any VSS protocol that relies
on a broadcast channel, while a generic construction of this sort for graded VSS
seems unlikely. Perhaps more importantly, mVSS provides what we believe to be a
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conceptually-simpler approach to the problem at hand: in addition to our authen-
ticated broadcast protocol for t < n/2, our techniques give a broadcast protocol (in
the plain model) for t < n/3 that is both more round-efficient than the Feldman-
Micali protocol and also admits a self-contained proof that is, in our opinion, signif-
icantly simpler than that of [FM97]. Moreover, the concept of moderated protocols
proved to be an useful technique in developing round-efficient secure multi-party
computation protocols (see discussion in the next section).
As mentioned earlier, cryptographic protocols are often designed under the
assumption that a broadcast channel is available; when run in a point-to-point
network, these protocols must “emulate” the broadcast channel by running a broad-
cast protocol as a sub-routine. If the original protocol uses multiple invocations of
the broadcast channel, and these invocations are each emulated using a probabilistic
broadcast protocol, subtle issues related to the parallel and sequential composition of
the various broadcast sub-protocols arise; see the detailed discussion in Section 3.3.
Parallel composition can be dealt with using existing techniques [BE03, FG03].
There are also techniques available for handling sequential composition of protocols
without simultaneous termination [BE03, LLR02]; however, it applies only to the
case t < n/3 [BE03] or else is rather complex [LLR02]. As an additional contri-
bution, we show how to extend previous work [BE03] so as to enable sequential
composition when t < n/2 (assuming digital signatures and a PKI) in a simpler and
more round-efficient manner than [LLR02].
The above results, in combination with prior work [BMR90, DI05], yield the
following result:
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Theorem 1.1.2 Assuming a public-key infrastructure and the existence of signature
schemes, there exists a secure multi-party computation protocol tolerating t < n/2
malicious parties running in expected constant rounds.
A preliminary version of this work appeared in [KK06].
1.1.2 Secure Multi-Party Computation
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) enables a group of parties to evaluate
a function f with the guarantee that each honest party will learn its output and
each corrupted party will only learn its own output but nothing more.
In below, we present the definition of secure computation without abort (the
definition is adapted from [GL05]), which is the standard definition used for the
case of honest majority. There are other (relaxed) definitions of secure computation
(see [GL05]), but we will not consider those here.
Multi-party function evaluation A multi-party computation problem for n par-
ties is cast by specifying a random process that maps vectors of inputs to vectors
of outputs (one input and one output for each party). We denote such process
f : ({0, 1}⋆)n → ({0, 1}⋆)n, where f = (f1, . . . , fn). That is, for a vector of inputs
x̄ = (x1, . . . , xn), the output vector is a random variable (f1(x̄), . . . , fn(x̄)) ranging
over vectors of strings. The output for the ith party (with input xi) is defined to be
fi(x̄).
The security of a multi-party computation protocol is analyzed by comparing
what an adversary (who controls the corrupted parties) can do in the protocol to
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what it can do in an ideal scenario that is secure by definition. This is formalized by
considering an ideal computation involving an incorruptible trusted party as follows:
Execution in the Ideal Model
1. Inputs: Each party Pi obtains its respective input xi.
2. Send inputs to trusted party: An honest party Pi always sends its input xi to
the trusted party. A corrupted party, on the other hand, may send modified
value x′i to the trusted party; x
′
i can be dependent on the inputs of other
corrupted parties. Let the sequence of inputs obtained by the trusted party
be x̄′.
3. Trusted party answers the parties: The trusted party computes f(x̄′) and
sends fi(x̄
′) to party Pi for every i.
4. Outputs: An honest party always outputs the message that it received from
the trusted party and the corrupted parties output nothing. The adversary
outputs an arbitrary function of the initial inputs of the corrupted parties and
the messages that the corrupted parties received from the trusted party.
Execution in the Real Model: In the real model, the parties execute a protocol Π
to evaluate f . Throughout the execution, the honest parties follow the instructions
of the prescribed protocol, while the corrupted parties may deviate from the protocol
in an arbitrary manner, subject to the choice of the adversary. At the end of
the protocol execution, the honest parties output their prescribed output from Π,
the corrupted parties output nothing and the adversary outputs its view of the
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computation.
Secure MPC: A protocol Π is said to be a secure MPC protocol for the computation
of f if for every adversary for the real model, there exists an ideal-world adversary
such that the following two distributions are indistinguishable:
• The joint output of the honest parties and the real-world adversary in the real
model.
• The joint output of the honest parties and the ideal-world adversary in the
ideal model.
As mentioned earlier, we will focus on studying the round complexity of protocols
for secure multi-party computation. Previous research investigating this aspect has
almost exclusively focused on optimizing the round complexity under the assumption
that a broadcast channel is available. (We survey some of this work later in this
section.) In most settings where MPC might potentially be used, however, only
point-to-point channels are likely to be available and a broadcast channel is not
expected to exist. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the last section, a broadcast channel
can always be emulated by having the parties run a broadcast protocol over the
point-to-point network.
We argue that if the ultimate goal is to optimize round complexity for point-
to-point networks (i.e., where the protocol will actually be run), then the above
may be a poor approach due to the high overhead introduced by the final step of
emulating the broadcast channel. Specifically:
• If the broadcast channel is emulated using a deterministic protocol [GM98,
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DS83], then a lower bound due to Fischer and Lynch [FL82] shows that Ω(t+R)
rounds are needed to emulate R rounds of broadcast in the original protocol
(this is true regardless of how many parties broadcast during the same round)
where t is the number of malicious parties. In particular, this will not lead to
sub-linear-round protocols with optimal security threshold t = Θ(n).
• Using randomized protocols, each round of broadcast in the original protocol
can be emulated in an expected constant number of rounds (see Chapter 3).
Nevertheless, the exact constant is rather high. More problematic is that if
broadcast is used in more than one round of the original protocol, then one
must explicitly handle sequential composition of protocols without simultane-
ous termination. (This is not an issue if broadcast is used in only a single
round.) Unfortunately, this leads to a substantial increase in round complex-
ity. See Section 3.3 for details.
To illustrate the second point, consider the protocols of Micali and Rabin
[MR90] and Fitzi, et al. [FGG+06] (building on [GIKR01]) for verifiable secret shar-
ing (VSS) with t < n/3. The Micali-Rabin protocol uses 16 rounds but only a single
round of broadcast; the protocol of Fitzi, et al. uses three rounds, two of which
involve broadcast. Compiling these protocols for a point-to-point network, using
the result from Chapter 3, the Micali-Rabin protocol runs in an expected 31 rounds
while the protocol by Fitzi, et al. requires an expected 55 rounds! The conclusion
is that optimizing round complexity using broadcast does not, in general, lead to
round-optimal protocols in the point-to-point model.
12
This suggests that if the ultimate goal is a protocol for a point-to-point net-
work, then it is preferable to focus on minimizing the number of rounds in which
broadcast is used rather than on minimizing the total number of rounds. This raises
in particular the following question:
Is it possible to construct constant-round protocols for
secure computation that use only a single round of broadcast?
Note that this is optimal in terms of the usage of the broadcast channel for a
constant-round secure MPC protocol, since secure computation of the broadcast
functionality requires a single invocation of the broadcast channel.
Our Contributions
As our main results, in Chapter 4, we show that:
Theorem 1.1.3 Assuming the existence of one-way functions, there is a constant-
round secure multi-party computation protocol tolerating t < n/3 malicious parties
that uses a single round of broadcast.
Theorem 1.1.4 Assuming the existence of one-way functions and a public-key in-
frastructure, there is a constant-round secure multi-party computation protocol tol-
erating t < n/2 malicious parties that uses a single round of broadcast.
We obtain the above results by using the concept of moderated protocols (see
previous section). Along with the construction of our protocols, we also develop
techniques to minimize the exact round complexity. Of course, the fact that a pro-
tocol uses broadcast in only a single round does not necessarily imply that it yields
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the most round-efficient protocol in a point-to-point setting. For the protocols we
construct, however, this is indeed the case (at least given the results in Chapter 3,
which contain the most round-efficient known techniques for emulating broadcast
over point-to-point channels). For example, using the results from Chapter 3, the
first protocol mentioned above requires 41 rounds (in expectation) when compiled
for a point-to-point network. In contrast, any protocol for t < n/3 that uses broad-
cast in two rounds (even if that is all it does!) will require at least 55 rounds (in
expectation) when run in a point-to-point network. We stress again that the main
issue in moving from one broadcast to two (or more) broadcasts is the significant
overhead in the latter case needed to deal with sequential composition of protocols
that do not terminate in the same round.
A preliminary version of this work appeared in [KK07].
Prior Work. Initial feasibility results showed the existence of unconditionally-
secure MPC protocols in point-to-point networks for t < n/3 (combining [BGW88,
CCD88] with [PSL80]), or for t < n/2 assuming a broadcast channel is available
[Bea91b, RB89, Rab94].
Beaver, Micali, and Rogaway [BMR90] gave the first constant-round protocol
for secure MPC with t < n/2, assuming a broadcast channel and one-way functions.
Damg̊ard and Ishai [DI05] showed a constant-round protocol under the same as-
sumptions that is secure even for adaptive adversaries. As mentioned in the previous
section, using our results, these can both be converted to expected constant-round
protocols in point-to-point networks. We stress that the constant obtained in this
way is rather high, on the order of hundreds of rounds.
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The work of Gennaro, et al. [GIKR01] implies a 3-round MPC protocol with
resilience t < n/4, assuming the existence of one-way functions. We remark that
the resulting protocol only uses broadcast in a single round, and so would yield a
very round-efficient protocol in a point-to-point network; the drawback is that the
resilience is not optimal. In subsequent work [GIKR02], the same authors show that
2-round MPC is not possible (in general) for t ≥ 2. However, they show that certain
functionalities can be securely computed in 2 rounds for t < n/6.
Goldwasser and Lindell [GL05] show various round-efficient secure MPC pro-
tocols for point-to-point networks that do not use broadcast; however, their work
considers weakened security definitions in which fairness and output delivery are not
guaranteed (even when an honest majority exists).
1.2 Part Two: Feasibility of Broadcast in Radio Networks
Much work has focused on the broadcast problem in a fully connected point-
to-point network. (We have surveyed these work in Section 1.1.1). Some research
has also explored the problem when pairwise channels exist only between selected
pairs of parties, or under the assumption of “k-cast channels” shared by all subsets
of parties of size k [FM00, ASS+03, CFF+05].
However, none of these models are appropriate for radio networks in which a
party can communicate only by multicasting a message which is then received by all
parties within some radius r (i.e., the neighbors of the transmitting party). With
recent advancements in wireless technology, deployment of large-scale networks in
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which the sole means of communication is via wireless (radio) transmission is now
possible. Since broadcast can serve as a building block for many applications in
these enviroments, it is of interest to establish the conditions under which it can
be achieved. Yet, as far as we are aware, prior to our work, obtaining broadcast
in radio networks in the presence of malicious parties has not been studied before.
Our work corrects this omission, and provides the first analysis of broadcast in radio
networks.
Our Contributions We study feasibility of broadcast in the following network
model: parties are located on an infinite grid (each grid unit is a 1 × 1 square). In
the absence of collisions, if a party locates at (x, y), P (x, y), multicasts a message
m, then all parties within distance r will receive the message. The parties within
the distance r from (x, y) are known as the neighbors of P (x, y). A collision at
(x, y) occurs when two neighbors P1, P2 of P (x, y) multicast at the same time. In
this case, there is no guarantee as to what message(s) P (x, y) will receive. (The
square grid model has been considered in [KKP01], in the context of minimizing
broadcast latency with crash failures.) We assume there exists a pre-determined
time division multiple access (TDMA) schedule such that if all parties follow the
schedule in carrying out local broadcast, then no collisions will occur.
We introduce the locally-bound fault model – which we believe is a natural
model for the distribution of corruption in radio networks. Under this fault model,
an adversary can corrupt up to t neighbors of any party.
A party corrupted by the adversary is allowed to deviate from the TDMA
schedule, cause message collision and send out spoofed address for a bounded number
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of times. We assume the bound are known in advance by all parties.
As our main result, in Chapter 4, we show the following:
Theorem 1.2.1 In the L∞ metric, if t <
1
2
r(2r + 1), then there exists a protocol
achieves broadcast as long as there is a bound on the number of collisions caused
and spoofed messages sent by each corrupted party.
The above result is tight in two ways. First, it is easy to see that there does
not exist any broadcast protocol in the presence of an adversary capable of causing
unbounded number of collisions. (An adversary can prevent an honest party from
receiving any message by continuously causing collisions.) Second, we show that it
is not possible to tolerate a larger value of t:
Theorem 1.2.2 In the L∞ metric, if t ≥
1
2
r(2r + 1), broadcast is impossible even
if the adversary cannot cause collisions nor send out spoofed address.
A preliminary version of this work appeared in [Koo04] and [KBKV06]. In
the first paper, we study broadcast assuming the adversary cannot cause collisions
nor send out spoofed address. Feasibility and impossibility results are shown. The
feasibility results are subsequently improved by Bhandari and Vaidya [BV05a], they
give an upper bound that matches the lower bound we gave in [Koo04] (as in [Koo04],
they assume the adversary cannot cause collisions nor send out spoofed address).
In [KBKV06], we show how to achieve the same upper bound as in [BV05a] even if
the adversary is allowed to cause a bounded number of collisions or sending out a
bounded number of spoofed address.
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Related and Subsequent Work. Prior work on broadcast in radio networks
mostly focus on minimizing the broadcast latency assuming the radio networks is
fault-free. As noted in [KKP01], not many results are known about broadcast in
radio networks in the presence of faults. Kranakis, Krizanc and Pelc [KKP01] con-
sider the effect of a passive adversary (a corrupted party will not send any message)
on the broadcast latency.
The initial results in [Koo04] are subsequently improved in [BV05a, Vai05]. In
the above mentioned work, it was assumed that the adversary cannot cause collisions
nor carry out address spoofing. Under this assumption, [BV05a] gave a protocol
that achieves broadcast when t < 1
2
r(2r + 1) for the L∞ metric. An approximate
threshold was also established for the L2 metric (the threshold is shown to be tight
asymptotically). In [BV05b], a sufficient condition for broadcast in general graphs
under the locally bounded adversarial model was described and simpler broadcast
protocols for a grid network (compared to [BV05a]) was presented.
Broadcast in an arbitrary graph was considered in [PP05a]. Upper and lower
bounds for achievability of broadcast were presented based on graph-theoretic pa-
rameters. However, no exact thresholds were established. It was also shown that
there exist certain graphs in which algorithms that work with knowledge of topology
succeed in achieving broadcast, while those lacking this knowledge fail.
Random transient failures were considered in [PP05b]. At each step, each
party may fail with some constant probability p. Tight bounds on p were obtained
concerning the feasibility of broadcast. Random permanent failures in a grid network
have been considered in [BV07], and necessary and sufficient conditions on the
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required transmission range r have been derived.
Achieving consensus in wireless network was studied in [CDG+05], but in a
slightly different model. A single-hop wireless broadcast network consisting of fixed
but a priori unknown collection of parties was considered. Parties can suffer from
crash-stop failures and messages can be lost. Necessary and sufficient conditions
were derived. Recently, Gilbert, et al.[GGN06] extend the result of [CDG+05] to
the case where a party can suffer from Byzantine failure and cause message collisions.
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Part I
Round-Efficient Protocols in Point-to-Point Networks
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Chapter 2
Model, Technical Preliminaries, and Basic Primitives
2.1 Model and Technical Preliminaries
Here, we describe the model that we consider in Part I and state the technical
preliminaries.
We consider the standard synchronous communication model where parties
communicate in synchronous rounds using pairwise private and authenticated chan-
nels. Authenticated channels can be realized using signature schemes if one is will-
ing to assume a public-key infrastructure (PKI). By a PKI in a network of n par-
ties, we mean that prior to any protocol execution all parties hold the same vector
(pk1, . . . , pkn) of public keys for a digital signature scheme, and each honest party
Pi holds the honestly-generated secret key ski associated with pki. Malicious parties
may generate their keys arbitrarily, even dependent on keys of honest parties. For
static adversaries, private channels can be realized using one additional round by
having each party Pi send to each party Pj a public key PKi,j for a semantically-
secure public-key encryption scheme (using a different key for each sender avoids
issues of malleability). For adaptive adversaries, more complicated solutions are
available [BH92, CFGN96] but we do not discuss these further. For simplicity, we
assume unconditional private/authenticated channels with the understanding that
these guarantees hold only computationally if the above techniques are used.
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When we say a protocol tolerates t malicious parties, we always mean that it
is secure against a rushing adversary who may adaptively corrupt up to t parties
during execution of the protocol and coordinate the actions of these parties as they
deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary manner. Parties not corrupted by the
adversary are called honest. For t < n/3 we do not assume any setup, but for
t < n/2 we assume a PKI and secure signature schemes (this is the authenticated
case). Protocols designed under this assumption are termed authenticated protocols.
In the protocol descriptions, we implicitly assume that all parties send a
properly-formatted message at all times (this is without loss of generality, as we
may interpret an improper or missing message as some default message).
When we describe signature computation in authenticated protocols we often
omit for simplicity additional information that should be signed along with the
message. That is, when we say that party Pi signs message m and sends it to Pj, we
implicitly mean that Pi signs the concatenation of m with additional information
including: (1) the identity of the recipient Pj , (2) the current round number, (3) an
identifier for the message (in case multiple messages are sent to Pj in the same
round); and (4) an identifier for the (sub-)protocol (in case multiple sub-protocols
are being run; cf. [LLR06]). This information is also verified, as appropriate, when
the signature is verified.
In some of our protocol constructions we assume a broadcast channel. A
broadcast channel allows any party to send the same message to all other parties
(and all parties to be assured they have received identical messages) in a single round.
As a convenient shorthand, we say that a protocol has round complexity (r, r′) if it
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uses r rounds in total and r′ ≤ r of these rounds invoke broadcast (possibly by all
parties). Notice that if a protocol has round complexity (x, 0), then the protocol
does not require a broadcast channel. When no broadcast is used sometimes we will
just say the protocol uses x rounds.
We use “=” to denote a test for equality, and “:=” to denote variable assign-
ment. We use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}.
The standard definition of broadcast follows.
Definition 1 (Broadcast): A protocol for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a dis-
tinguished dealer P ∗ ∈ P holds an initial input M , is a broadcast protocol tolerating
t malicious parties if the following conditions hold for any adversary controlling at
most t parties:
Agreement All honest parties output the same value.
Validity If the dealer is honest, then all honest parties output M . ♦
2.2 Basic Primitives
We now define and construct some basic primitives for constructing the pro-
tocols in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
2.2.1 Gradecast
Gradecast, a relaxed version of broadcast, was introduced by Feldman and
Micali [FM97, Def. 11]; we provide a definition which is slightly weaker than theirs
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but suffices for our purposes.
Definition 2 (Gradecast):
A protocol for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a distinguished dealer P
∗ ∈ P
holds an initial input M , is a gradecast protocol tolerating t malicious parties if the
following conditions hold for any adversary controlling at most t parties:
• Each honest party Pi outputs a message mi and a grade gi ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
• If the dealer is honest, then the output of every honest party Pi satisfies
mi = M and gi = 2.
• If there exists an honest party Pi who outputs a message mi and the grade
gi = 2, then the output of every honest party Pj satisfies mj = mi and gj ≥ 1.
♦
The following result is due to [FM97] and proved for completeness below:
Lemma 2.2.1 There exists a (3, 0)-round gradecast protocol tolerating t < n/3 ma-
licious parties.
Proof The protocol proceeds as follows:
Round 1 The dealer sends M to all other parties.
Round 2 Let Mi denote the message received by Pi (from the dealer) in the pre-
vious round. Pi sends Mi to all the parties.
Round 3 Let Mj,i denote the message received by Pi from Pj in the previous round.
Each party Pi does the following: if there exists an M
∗
i such that |{j : Mj,i =
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M∗i }| ≥ 2n/3 then Pi sends this M
∗
i to all the parties. Otherwise, Pi sends
nothing.
Output determination Let M∗j,i denote the message (if any) received by Pi from
Pj in the previous round. Each party Pi determines its output as follows: if




i }| ≥ 2n/3, then Pi outputs
mi := M
∗∗
i and gi := 2. Otherwise, if there exists
1 an M∗∗i such that |{j :
M∗j,i = M
∗∗
i }| ≥ n/3, then Pi outputs mi := M
∗∗
i and gi := 1. Otherwise, Pi
outputs mi :=⊥ and gi := 0.
Let us now prove that the above protocol satisfies Definition 2. Assume first
that the dealer is honest. Then each honest party Pi receives Mi = M in round 1
and sends this to all parties in round 2. So in round 3, for each honest Pi it holds
that M∗i = M and so Pi sends this value to all the parties. It follows that any honest
party Pi outputs mi = M and gi = 2.
Before proving the second required property, we show that if any two honest
parties Pi, Pj send a message in round 3 then they in fact send the same message.
To see this, say Pi sends M
∗
i in round 3. Then Pi must have received M
∗
i from at
least 2n/3 parties in round 2, and so strictly more than n/3 honest parties must





strictly fewer than n− n/3 = 2n/3 parties in round 2, and so Pj either sends M
∗
i or
nothing in round 3.
1It will follow from the proof below that at most one such M∗∗i exists in this case.
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Now assume there is an honest party Pi who outputs a message mi and grade
gi = 2, and let Pj be any other honest party. Pi must have received mi from at
least 2n/3 parties in round 3, and so more than n/3 honest parties sent mi as their
round-3 message. It follows that |{k : M∗k,j = mi}| ≥ n/3 and so Pj outputs grade
gj ≥ 1. Say there was an mj 6= mi for which |{k : M
∗
k,j = mj}| ≥ n/3. Then at
least one honest party sent mj 6= mi as its round-3 message, contradicting what we
have shown in the previous paragraph. So, Pj outputs message mi as required.
Next, we prove an analogue of the above for the case of authenticated gradecast.
Lemma 2.2.2 There exists a (4, 0)-round authenticated gradecast protocol tolerating
t < n/2 malicious parties.
Proof The protocol proceeds as follows:
Round 1 The dealer computes a signature σ of M and sends (M, σ) to all parties.
Round 2 Let (Mi, σi) be the message received by party Pi (from the dealer) in
the previous round. If σi is a valid signature of Mi (with respect to the
dealer’s public key), then Pi sends (Mi, σi) to all other parties; otherwise Pi
sets Mi :=⊥ and sends nothing.
Round 3 Let (Mj,i, σj,i) be the message received by Pi from Pj in the previous
round. If there exists a j such that Mj,i 6= Mi but σj,i is a valid signature of
Mj,i (with respect to the dealer’s public key), then Pi sets Mi :=⊥.
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If Mi 6=⊥, then Pi computes a signature σ
′
i of Mi and sends (Mi, σ
′
i) to all
parties. (If Mi =⊥, then Pi sends nothing.)
Round 4 Let (M ′j,i, σ
′
j,i) be the message received by Pi from Pj in the previous
round. If there exist ℓ ≥ n/2 distinct indices j1, . . . , jℓ and a message M
∗ such
that M ′j1,i = · · · = M
′
jℓ,i
= M∗ and σ′jk,i is a valid signature of M
∗ (with respect








to all other parties and outputs mi := M
∗, gi := 2.
Output determination Assuming Pi has not decided on its output, it proceeds as
follows: If in the previous round Pi received any message (M
∗, j1, σ
′
1, . . . , jℓ, σ
′
ℓ)
for which ℓ ≥ n/2, the {jk}
ℓ
k=1 are distinct, and σ
′
k is a valid signature of M
∗
with respect to the public key of party Pjk for 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ, then Pi outputs
mi := M
∗, gi := 1. Otherwise, Pi outputs mi :=⊥, gi := 0.
We show the above protocol satisfies Definition 2. If the dealer is honest, then
in round 3 every honest party Pi computes a signature σ
′
i of the dealer’s message
M and sends (M, σ′i) to all other parties. Thus, all honest parties will receive at
least n/2 correct signatures on M in round 4, and every honest party Pi will output
mi = M, gi = 2 in round 4.
Before proving the second required property, we first show that no two honest
parties Pi, Pj send messages (Mi, σ
′
i) and (Mj , σ
′
j) in round 3 with Mi 6= Mj . To see
this, note that in round 3, the message Mi (resp., Mj) is either equal to ⊥ or to the
message sent by the dealer to Pi (resp., Pj) in the first round. So if the dealer sent
a valid signature on the same message to parties Pi, Pj in the first round, the claim
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is obviously true. On the other hand, in any other case at least one of Pi, Pj will
not send any message at all in round 3 (as at least one of mi =⊥ or mj =⊥ will
then hold).
Say a value M∗ is certified if, in round 4, an honest player holds (M∗, j1, σ
′
1,
. . . , jℓ, σ
′




k a valid signature of M
∗ with




∗. Note that any certified value is certified by at least one
honest party. Since any honest parties who sign a message in round 3 sign the same
message, as argued in the previous paragraph, it follows that at most one value is
certified.
Now, say there is an honest party Pi who outputs some message mi and gi = 2.
It follows easily that any honest party Pj who did not output gj = 2 immediately
in round 4 will output gj = 1 (and hence we have gj ≥ 1). Since, as we have
just argued, at most one value can be certified, it follows that all honest parties
output mi.
We remark that it is possible to construct authenticated gradecast protocol for
t ≥ n/2 [GKKO]. However, we do not need this result here. On the other hand, it
is impossible to achieve gradecast for t ≥ n/3 without any setup assumption. This
follows directly from the impossibility proof for broadcast when t ≥ n/3 as given
in [PSL80, LSP82].
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2.2.2 Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS)
Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS)[CGMA85] extends the concept of secret shar-
ing [Bla79, Sha79] in the sense that it considers the presence of malicious parties,
rather than just honest-but-curious parties.
Definition 3 (Verifiable secret sharing): A two-phase protocol for parties P =
{P1, . . . , Pn}, where a distinguished dealer P
∗ ∈ P holds initial input s, is a VSS
protocol tolerating t malicious parties if the following conditions hold for any adver-
sary controlling at most t parties:
Validity Each honest party Pi outputs a value si at the end of the second phase
(the reconstruction phase). Furthermore, if the dealer is honest then si = s.
Secrecy If the dealer is honest at the end of the first phase (the sharing phase), then
at the end of this phase the joint view of the malicious parties is independent
of the dealer’s input s.
Reconstruction At the end of the sharing phase the joint view of the honest parties
defines a value s′ (which can be computed in polynomial time from this view)
such that all honest parties will output s′ at the end of the reconstruction
phase. ♦
2.2.2.1 The Case of t < n/3
While VSS protocols tolerating t < n/3 malicious parties are known in the
literature (cf. [GIKR01, FGG+06]), we present a new VSS protocol below that can
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be used to optimize the round complexity of protocols constructed in Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4.
Lemma 2.2.3 There exists a VSS protocol tolerating t < n/3 malicious parties such
that the round complexity of its sharing phase is (7, 1) and the round complexity of
its reconstruction phase is (1, 0).
Proof The VSS protocol due to Gennaro, et al. [GIKR01] uses 3 rounds of broad-
cast in the sharing phase. Below, we give a VSS protocol that uses only 1 round
of broadcast in the sharing phase. On a high level, our protocol is obtained by
applying two modifications to the protocol in [GIKR01]:
• Instead of using a ‘random pad’ technique to detect inconsistent shares —
which invokes one round of broadcast — we use a different method that does
not require broadcast at all.
• After the above step, two rounds of broadcast still remain. We devise a way for
parties to postpone the first broadcast (and then combine it with the second)
without affecting the progress of the protocol.
Let F be a finite field with s ∈ F, |F| > n, and [n] can be mapped injectively
to F. When the we say the dealer is disqualified this means that execution of the




Round 1 The dealer P ∗ chooses a random bivariate polynomial F ∈ F[x, y] of
degree at most t in each variable with F (0, 0) = s. The dealer sends to Pi the
polynomials gi(x)
def
= F (x, i) and hi(y)
def
= F (i, y).
Round 2 Pi sends hi(j) to Pj .
Round 3 Let h′j,i be the value Pi received from Pj . If h
′
j,i 6= gi(j), then Pi sends
“complain(i, j)” to the dealer.
Round 4 If the dealer receives “complain(i, j)” from Pi in the last round, then the
dealer sends “complain(i, j)” to Pj .
Round 5 For every ordered pair (i, j), parties Pi, Pj, and the dealer P
∗ do the
following:
• If Pi sent “complain(i, j)” to the dealer in round 3, then Pi sends “(Pi,
i,j) : gi(j)” to all parties; else Pi sends “(Pi, i, j): no complaint” to all
parties.
• If Pj received “complain(i, j)” from the dealer in round 4, then Pj sends
“(Pj , i, j) : hj(i)” to all parties; else Pj sends “(Pj, i, j): no complaint”
to all parties.
• If the dealer received “complain(i, j)” from Pi in round 3, then the dealer
sends “(P ∗, i, j) : F (j, i)” to all parties; else, the dealer sends “(P ∗, i, j):
no complaint” to all parties.
Round 6 A party forwards all the messages it received in last round to all parties.
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Round 7 The dealer does the following:
• For every ordered pair (i, j), if in round 6 the dealer received messages
of the form “(Pi, i, j) : X” and “(P
∗, i, j) : Y ,” with2 X 6= Y , each from
t + 1 different parties, then the dealer broadcasts the polynomials gi(x)
and hi(y).
• Similarly, for every ordered pair (i, j), if in round 6 the dealer received
messages of the form “(Pj , i, j) : X” and “(P
∗, i, j) : Y ,” with X 6= Y ,
each from t + 1 different parties, then the dealer broadcasts the polyno-
mials gj(x) and hj(y).
In parallel with the above, all parties Pk do the following (in round 7):
• For every message m Pk received in round 5, Pk broadcasts m.
• For every ordered pair (i, j), if in round 6 Pk received messages of the
form “(Pi, i, j) : X” and “(P
∗, i, j) : Y ,” with X 6= Y , from t+1 different









• Similarly, for every ordered pair (i, j), if in round 6 Pk received messages
of the form “(Pj, i, j) : X” and “(P
∗, i, j) : Y ,” with X 6= Y , from t + 1









Output determination Parties decide on their output as follows:
1. A party Pi is said to announce a message m if, in round 7, at least n− t
parties broadcast that they received m from Pi in round 5.
2Note that X or Y can be field elements or the string “no complaint.”
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2. A party Pi is unhappy if Pi announced a message of the form “(Pi, i, j) :
Y ,” the dealer announced a message of the form “(P ∗, i, j) : X,” and
X 6= Y .
Similarly, Pi is unhappy if Pi announced a message of the form “(Pi, j, i) :
Y ,” the dealer announced a message of the form “(P ∗, j, i) : X,” and
X 6= Y .
3. A party Pi that is not unhappy becomes sad if, in round 7, for some
unhappy party Pj, the dealer broadcasts polynomials gj(x) and hj(y),




i,j with gj(i) 6= b
′
i,j or hj(i) 6= c
′
i,j.
We remark that since broadcast is invoked in round 7, all parties agree
on whether a party is unhappy or sad.
4. The dealer is disqualified if any of the following conditions hold:
(DQ.1) There exists an ordered pair (i, j) such that the dealer does not
announce a message of the form “(P ∗, i, j) : X.”
(DQ.2) There exists an unhappy party Pi such that the dealer does not
broadcast gi(x) or hi(y) in round 7.
(DQ.3) The number of unhappy and sad parties exceeds t.
Note that all parties agree whether a dealer is disqualified.
5. A party that is neither unhappy nor sad is said to be happy. If the dealer
has not been disqualified, then a happy party Pi keeps the polynomials
gi(x) and hi(y) that it received from the dealer in the first round. An
unhappy party Pi takes the polynomials broadcasted by the dealer in
33
round 7 as gi(x) and hi(y). (We do not define what sad parties do, since
it is not hard to see that if the dealer is not disqualified then all sad
parties are malicious.)
Reconstruction Phase
Round 1 If Pi was happy by the end of the sharing phase, then Pi sends si := gi(0)
to all parties; otherwise, Pi sends nothing.
Output determination Party Pi proceeds as follows: if Pj was happy by the
end of the sharing phase, let sj be the value Pj sent to Pi in the previous
round; otherwise, set sj := gj(0) (where gj(x) is the polynomial broadcast
by the dealer in round 7 of the sharing phase). Let g(y) be the degree-t
polynomial resulting from applying Reed-Solomon error-correction [RS60] to
(s1, s2, . . . , sn). Output g(0).
We begin our analysis of the protocol with two observations:
(Ob. 1) If an honest party Pi sends a message m to all parties in round 5, then Pi
will be considered as announcing m by the end of round 7.
(Ob. 2) If a (possibly malicious) party Pi announces a message m, then every honest
party received m from at least t + 1 different parties in round 6.
If an honest party Pi sends a message m to all parties in round 5, then all honest
parties receive it. Since all honest parties broadcast this information in round 7 and
there are at least n − t of them, (Ob. 1) holds. If a party Pi announces a message
m, then, by definition, in round 7 at least n− t parties broadcast that they received
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m from Pi in round 5. At least n − t− t ≥ t + 1 of them are honest. These ≥ t + 1
parties forward m to all parties in round 6. Hence (Ob. 2) holds.
We now prove secrecy. For the rest of this paragraph, assume the dealer is
honest. We claim that the information the malicious parties have about the dealer’s
secret s by the end of the sharing phase consists entirely of the polynomials sent
to the malicious parties by the dealer in round 1; secrecy then follows since F is a
degree-t bivariate polynomial and there are at most t malicious parties. To prove the
claim, we first show that no additional information is leaked in rounds 2 through 6.
Let Pi and Pj be two honest parties. Pi will not send “complain(i, j)” to the dealer
in round 3. Hence, regarding the pair (i, j), parties Pi, Pj and the dealer send “no
complaint” to other parties in round 5. Therefore no information about F (j, i) is
revealed in rounds 2 through 6. Next, we show that round 7 does not leak any
additional information. Suppose Pi is honest, and consider an arbitrary Pk. If Pi
sends “(Pi, i, k) : X” (resp., “(Pi, k, i) : X”) to all parties in round 5 for some string
X, then the dealer sends “(P ∗, i, k) : X” (resp., “(P ∗, k, i) : X”) to all parties in
round 5 (for the same X). In round 6, for any Y 6= X, an honest party receives
at most t copies of “(Pi, i, k) : Y ” or “(P
∗, i, k) : Y ” (resp., “(Pi, k, i) : Y ” or
“(P ∗, k, i) : Y ”) from the malicious parties. Hence no honest Pj broadcasts hj(i) or
gj(i) in round 7. Similarly, the dealer does not broadcast gi(x) or hi(y) in round 7.
Next we prove the validity and reconstruction properties. In fact, we will prove
something stronger: we show that by the end of the sharing phase, if the dealer
has not been disqualified (notice that an honest dealer will never be disqualified),




= F ′(x, i) and hi(y)
def
= F ′(i, y), and, if the dealer is honest, then
F ′(0, 0) = s. Note that if the above holds, every honest party sends si = gi(0) =
F ′(0, i) to all other parties in the reconstruction phase. Since n > 3t and there are
at most t “bad” shares in {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, Reed-Solomon error-correction recovers
the polynomial g(y) = F ′(0, y) and hence all honest parties output g(0) = F ′(0, 0).
Recall that if the dealer is disqualified, then a default value is shared.
In the case of an honest dealer, the dealer will never be disqualified and an
honest party will never be unhappy or sad. It follows readily that each Pi holds the
polynomials gi(x)
def
= F (x, i) and hi(y)
def
= F (i, y). Hence the validity property holds
for the case of an honest dealer.
Next we consider the case of a malicious dealer who is not disqualified.
We first show that for any honest Pi, Pj that are not unhappy, hj(i) = gi(j).
Assume the contrary. Then Pi sends “complain(i, j)” to the dealer in round 3 and
announces “(Pi, i, j) : gi(j)” in round 5 (following (Ob. 1)). Depending on the
actions of the dealer, Pj announces “(Pj, i, j) : hj(i)” or “(Pj, i, j) : no complaint”.
No matter what the dealer announces regarding the pair (i, j), at least one of Pi, Pj
becomes unhappy. (Note that a non-disqualified dealer has to announce something
regarding (i, j) due to (DQ. 1).) This contradicts the assumption that both Pi and
Pj are not unhappy.
We now use the following claim [FM97, Lemma 2]:
Claim 2.2.4 Let x1, x2, . . . , xt+1 be distinct elements in F, and Q1(y), . . . , Qt+1(y)
be polynomials of degree at most t. Then there exists an unique bivariate polynomial
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F (x, y) of degree at most t in both variables such that F (xi, y) = Qi(y) for i =
1, . . . , t + 1.
Let H be the set of honest players that are happy. If the dealer is not disqual-
ified, there are at least 2t + 1 happy parties at the end of the sharing phase (due to
(DQ. 3)) and at least t + 1 of them are honest. Hence |H| ≥ t + 1.
Without loss of generality, assume P1, . . . , Pt+1 ∈ H. By Claim 2.2.4, there
exists a unique bivariate polynomial F ′(x, y) of degree at most t in both variables
such that F ′(i, y) = hi(y) for i ∈ [t + 1]. Before continuing, note that (using
Claim 2.2.4 again) there exists an F ′′(x, y) such that F ′′(x, i) = gi(x) for i ∈ [t + 1].
But then for any i, j ∈ [t + 1], we have F ′(i, j) = hi(j) = gj(i) = F
′′(i, j) and so in
fact F ′ = F ′′. Now consider a happy honest party Pi such that i /∈ [t + 1]. Since
hi(j) = gj(i) and gi(j) = hj(i) for any j ∈ [t + 1], it follows that F
′(x, i) = gi(x)
and F ′(i, y) = hi(y) .
Let us now prove that F ′(x, i) = gi(x) and F
′(i, y) = hi(y) for all honest
parties Pi. There are three cases to consider:
1. If Pi ∈ H then it is shown as above.
2. If Pi is unhappy, then due to (DQ. 2) the dealer must have broadcasted gi(x)
and hi(y). For any Pj ∈ H, following (Ob. 2) and the definition of unhappy, Pj
broadcasts b′j,i = hj(i) = F
′(j, i) and c′j,i = gj(i) = F
′(i, j). Since Pj does not
become sad, gi(j) = b
′
j,i = F
′(j, i) and hi(j) = c
′
j,i = F
′(i, j). Since |H| ≥ t+1
and gi(x), hi(y) are polynomials of degree t, it follows that gi(x) = F
′(x, i)
and hi(y) = F
′(i, y).
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3. The final case is that Pi is sad. We show that no such (honest) party exists.
To see this, consider a party Pj ∈ H. Because Pi and Pj are both not unhappy,
we have hi(j) = gj(i) = F
′(i, j). Since |H| ≥ t+1 and hi(y) is a polynomial of
degree at most t, we conclude that hi(y) = F
′(i, y). Similarly, gi(x) = F
′(x, i).
We have already shown (in the second case, above) that for all polynomials
gk(x) and hk(y) broadcast by the dealer in round 7 where Pk is unhappy, we
have gk(x) = F
′(x, k) and hk(y) = F
′(k, y). Thus, for all such polynomials gk
and hk we have hi(k) = F
′(i, k) = gk(i), gi(k) = F
′(k, i) = hk(i) and so Pi
should not be sad.
The reconstruction property follows.
2.2.2.2 The Authenticated Case (t < n/2)
We prove an analogue of the previous section for the case of authenticated
VSS. We remark that VSS protocols tolerating t < n/2 malicious parties without
assuming a PKI are known in the literature (cf. [Rab94, CDD+99]). However the
protocol we give below can be used to optimize the round complexity of protocols
constructed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. We also remark that it follows from the
definition VSS is impossible for t ≥ n/2 (even for the authenticated case).
Lemma 2.2.5 There exists an authenticated VSS protocol tolerating t < n/2 mali-
cious parties such that the round complexity of its sharing phase is (5, 1) (i.e., the
sharing phase requires five rounds of interaction and one of the five rounds uses
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broadcast) and the round complexity of its reconstruction phase is (1, 0).
Proof We assume a finite field F with s ∈ F, |F| > n, and [n] can be mapped
injectively to F. If the dealer is disqualified then execution of the protocol halts,
and all parties output some default value in the reconstruction phase. Finally, we
say an ordered sequence of values (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ F
n is t-consistent if there exists a
polynomial f of degree at most t such that f(i) = vi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The following protocol is adapted from [CDD+99]. The round complexity of
the sharing phase is (4, 2) and the round complexity of the reconstruction phase is
(1, 0). Later, we will show how to modify the protocol so that the round complexity
of the sharing phase becomes (5, 1).
Sharing Phase
Round 1 The dealer chooses a random bivariate polynomial F ∈ F[x, y] of degree
at most t in each variable with F (0, 0) = s. Let ai,j = bi,j
def
= F (i, j). The
dealer sends to party Pi the values a1,i, . . . , an,i and bi,1, . . . , bi,n, along with a
digital signature on each such value.
Round 2 If Pi receives all values (with valid signatures) from the dealer as specified
in round 1, and (a1,i, a2,i, . . . , an,i) and (bi,1, bi,2, . . . , bi,n) are both t-consistent,
then Pi computes signature σj,i on (j, i, aj,i), and sends (aj,i, σj,i) to party Pj
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, else Pi sends “Complaint: dealer” to all other parties.
Round 3 If Pi sent “Complaint: dealer” to all other parties in round 2, then Pi
broadcasts “Complaint: dealer”; else if Pi received “Complaint: dealer” from
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Pj, or Pi did not receive a valid signature σi,j (with respect to the public key
of Pj) on (i, j, ai,j) from Pj, then Pi broadcasts bi,j, as well as the signature of
the dealer on bi,j (in this case, we say the value bi,j has been made public).
Round 4 If a party Pj broadcast a complaint in round 3, then the dealer broadcasts
~aj = (a1,j, . . . , an,j), ~bj = (bj,1, . . . , bj,n).
For any party Pi that did not broadcast a complaint in round 3,
1. If a party Pj broadcast a complaint in round 3, then then Pi broadcasts
aj,i and bi,j with the dealer’s signature on these two values.
2. If a party Pj broadcasts a value bj,i (with a valid signature from the dealer
on bj,i) in round 3, then Pi broadcasts aj,i and the signature of the dealer
on aj,i.
The dealer is disqualified if any one of the following conditions hold:
1. If there exists a party Pj that broadcast a complaint in round 3, but the
dealer did not respond to it in round 4; or the dealer did respond but
either ~aj or ~bj broadcasted by the dealer is not t-consistent, or aj,j 6= bj,j.
2. There exists a pair (i, j) such that each of ai,j and bi,j has been broad-
casted by the dealer in round 4 or has been broadcasted by a party along
with the dealer’s signature on the value, and ai,j 6= bi,j.
Note that all parties agree on whether a dealer is disqualified.
Reconstruction Phase
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Round 1 For every j such that Pi has a valid signature σi,j (with respect to the
public key of Pj) on (i, j, bi,j), party Pi sends (bi,j , σi,j) to all other parties.
Note that for all other j, party Pi has already broadcast bi,j (with the dealer’s
signature) in round 3 of the sharing phase.
Output determination For each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, party Pi verifies the signatures on
the values received from Pj in the previous round, and disqualifies Pj if any
of the signatures are invalid.





(bj,1, . . . , bj,n) (each of these values was either received from Pj in the previous
round or was broadcast by Pj in round 3 of the sharing phase). If ~b
j
i is not
t-consistent, Pi disqualifies Pj.
Let Hi be the set of non-disqualified parties, from the perspective of Pi. For
each j ∈ Hi, party Pi interpolates ~b
j
i to obtain a polynomial f
′
j(y) of degree at
most t (recall that ~bji is t-consistent). Next, Pi interpolates the {f
′
j(y)}j∈Hi to
obtain bivariate polynomial F ′(x, y) of degree at most t in both variables (the
proof below will show that this is possible). Output F ′(0, 0).
We first prove secrecy of the above protocol. If the dealer is honest, no honest
party will send “Complaint: dealer” in step 2. Furthermore, if both Pi, Pj are honest,
then Pj will receive a valid signature σj,i (with respect to the public key of Pi) on
(j, i, aj,i) from Pi. Hence the value of aj,i will not be broadcast in step 3 nor step 4.
It follows that the information the adversary has about s by the end of the sharing
phase consists entirely of the values sent to the corrupted parties by the dealer in
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round 1. Secrecy follows since F is a bivariate polynomial of degree at most t in
both variables.
We next prove validity. It is easy to see that an honest dealer is never disqual-
ified. Let Pi, Pj be two parties that remain honest throughout the entire execution.
The vector ~bji (in the reconstruction phase) matches the values sent by the dealer in
round 1 and furthermore Pj ∈ Hi; thus, Pi recovers f
′
j(y) = F (j, y) for every honest
Pj. For any malicious Pk ∈ Hi, the value bk,j that Pi holds was either signed by
Pj (in round 2), or broadcast by Pj (in round 4), and so bk,j = F (k, j). Since this
holds for at least t + 1 honest parties Pj and ~b
k
i is t-consistent (else k 6∈ Hi), we
conclude that Pi recovers f
′
k(y) = F (k, y) in this case as well. So interpolating the
{f ′j(y)}j∈Hi yields F (x, y) (interpolation can be done since |Hi| ≥ t + 1), and the
output of Pi is the dealer’s secret F (0, 0).
Finally, we prove reconstruction. The case of an honest dealer has been proven
above. The case when the dealer is disqualified is obvious, so consider a (corrupted)
dealer who is not disqualified.
Let U be the indices of a set of t + 1 parties who are honest at the end of
the sharing phase. For an honest party Pi, let ~b
i = (bi,1, . . . , bi,n) denote the values
that Pi will “effectively” send to other parties in the reconstruction phase (note
that some of these values may, in fact, already have been broadcast). Let f ′i(y) be
the result of interpolating ~bi (this is well-defined since ~bi is t-consistent for honest
Pi), and let F
′(x, y) be the result of interpolating {f ′i(y)}i∈U . We will show that
regardless of the actions of the adversary in the reconstruction phase, each honest
party outputs F ′(0, 0).
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By construction of F ′, we have bi,k = F
′(i, k) for i ∈ U . We claim that
ak,i = F
′(k, i) for i ∈ U . Let g′i(x) be the result of interpolating ~a
i = (a1,i, . . . , an,i)
(again, this is well-defined since ~ai is t-consistent for Pi honest). Note that for j ∈ U
we have g′i(j)
def
= aj,i = bj,i or else the dealer would have been disqualified. So g
′
i(x)
agrees with F ′(x, i) on t + 1 points and hence these polynomials must be identical,
proving the claim.
Applying a similar argument (using the fact that, for Pi honest and j ∈ U ,
we have bi,j = ai,j = F
′(i, j) or else the dealer is disqualified), we see that for any
honest Pi the vector ~b
i interpolates to f ′i(y) = F
′(i, y). Furthermore, it is easy to see
that if Pi, Pj remain honest then Pi ∈ Hj. For any corrupted Pk ∈ Hj and honest
Pi, the value bk,i that Pk sends to Pj in the reconstruction phase was either signed
by Pi (in round 2) or broadcast by Pi (in round 4), and so bk,i = F
′(k, i). Since this
holds for at least t + 1 honest parties Pi and ~b
k
j is t-consistent (else k 6∈ Hj), we
conclude that Pj recovers f
′
k(y) = F
′(k, y) in this case as well. So interpolating the
{f ′i(y)}i∈Hj yields F
′(x, y) (interpolation can be done since |Hj| ≥ t + 1), and the
output of Pj is F
′(0, 0).
Reducing the number of broadcasts: The sharing phase of the above protocol
uses two rounds of broadcast. Basically, they are used in the following manner:
1. In round 3, if certain conditions hold, then Pi broadcasts some message x.
2. In round 4, if Pi broadcasts some particular message y in round 3, then Pj
broadcasts some message z.
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Call the above protocol Π. We construct an authenticated VSS protocol Π′
such that the round complexity of its sharing phase is (5, 1). The first two rounds
(of the sharing phase) of Π′ are the same as that of Π. The third round of the
sharing phase of Π is replaced by two rounds in Π′:
Round 3 If Pi is supposed to broadcast x in round 3 of the sharing phase of Π,
then Pi sends x to all parties, along with a signature on x.
Round 4 If Pk receives x with a valid signature from Pi, then Pk forwards x (with
the signature of Pi on x) to all parties.
The fifth (last) round of Π′ proceeds as follow:
Round 5 If Pj receives at least one copy of y (with a valid signature of Pi on y)
in round 4 (of Π′), then Pj broadcasts (Pi, y, z). If Pk receives x from Pi in
round 3 (with a valid signature of Pi on x), then Pk broadcasts (Pi, x).
To determine if the dealer is disqualified by the end of the sharing phase of Π′,
we use the same conditions as that of Π but we consider the set of broadcast values
as follows:
• If at least t+1 parties broadcast (Pi, x) in round 5 of Π
′, then Pi is considered
to have broadcast x in round 3 of Π.
• If, in round 5 of Π′, at least t + 1 parties broadcast (Pi, x) and Pj broadcasts
(Pi, x, z), then Pj is considered to broadcast z in round 4 of Π.
• If, in round 5 of Π′, at least t + 1 parties broadcast (Pi, y) but party Pj does
not broadcast (Pi, y, z) (even if it is supposed to), then Pj is considered to
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broadcast a default value z in round 4 of Π. (It follows from our discussion
below that Pj must be corrupted.)
The reconstruction phase of Π′ is the same as that of Π. To claim that Π′ is
a VSS protocol, we first note that
• In Π, if an honest party Pi is supposed to broadcast x in round 3, then in Π
′,
Pi sends x to all parties (with a signature on x) in round 3, and in round 5 at
least t + 1 honest parties broadcast (Pi, x).
• In Π, if an honest party Pj is supposed to broadcast z in round 4 after Pi
broadcast y in round 3, then in Π′, if t+1 parties broadcast (Pi, y) in round 5,
since at least one of these t+1 parties is honest, Pj will receive at least 1 copy
of y (with a valid signature of Pi on y) in round 4 and thus it will broadcast
(Pi, y, z) in round 5.
Also, note that in round 5 of the sharing phase of Π′, some party Pj may
broadcast (Pi, y, z) but less than t+1 parties broadcast (Pi, y). However, the message
(Pi, y, z) does not have any effect on the output determination as the honest parties
ignore it. Notice that this can happen only when Pi is corrupted (Pj may or may
not be honest). Validity and reconstruction then follow from the proof of Π. To
claim secrecy, we simply observe that if the dealer is honest, then no honest party
is going to send “Complaint: dealer” in round 2. Thus, no additional information
is revealed to the adversary during round 3 to round 5 of the sharing phase of Π′.
We now get an authenticated VSS protocol such that the round complexity of
its sharing phase is (5, 1).
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Chapter 3
Expected Constant-Round Broadcast Protocols
In this chapter, we construct expected constant-round broadcast protocols for
both the case t < n/3 (where we do not make any setup assumption) and the
case t < n/2 (the authenticated setting, where a PKI is available). We develop
both protocols in parallel so as to highlight the high-level similarities in each. In
Section 3.1, we introduce a variant of VSS (see Def. 3) called moderated VSS, and
we show how to construct protocols for moderated VSS without invoking broadcast,
by using VSS and gradecast (see Def. 2) as primitives. In Section 3.1.1, we define
oblivious leader election and construct the corresponding protocols from moderated
VSS. In Section 3.2, we construct broadcast protocols from oblivious leader election.
As mentioned in the Introduction, if a probabilistic broadcast protocol is used
to emulate multiple invocations of a broadcast channel, then subtle issues related to
the parallel and sequential composition of the various broadcast sub-protocols arise.
We discuss these issues and show how to handle them in Section 3.3.
3.1 Moderated VSS
We introduce a variant of VSS called moderated VSS, in which there is a dis-
tinguished party (who may be identical to the dealer) called the moderator. Roughly
speaking, the moderator “simulates” a broadcast channel for the other parties dur-
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ing the sharing phase. At the end of the sharing phase, parties output a boolean flag
indicating whether or not they trust the moderator. If the moderator is honest, all
honest parties set this flag to 1. Furthermore, if any honest party sets this flag to 1
then the protocol achieves all the properties of VSS. A formal definition follows.
Definition 4 (Moderated VSS): A two-phase protocol for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn},
where there is a distinguished dealer P ∗ ∈ P who holds an initial input s and a
moderator P ∗∗ ∈ P (who may possibly be the dealer), is a moderated VSS proto-
col tolerating t malicious parties if the following conditions hold for any adversary
controlling at most t parties:
Output Requirement Each honest party Pi outputs a bit fi at the end of the
first phase (called the sharing phase), and a value si at the end of the second
phase (called the reconstruction phase).
Completeness If the moderator is honest during the sharing phase, then each
honest party Pi outputs fi = 1 at the end of this phase.
Soundness If there exists an honest party Pi who outputs fi = 1 at the end of the
sharing phase, then the protocol achieves VSS; specifically: (1) if the dealer is
honest then all honest parties output s at the end of the reconstruction phase,
and the joint view of all the malicious parties at the end of the sharing phase
is independent of s, and (2) the joint view of the honest parties at the end
of the sharing phase defines an efficiently-computable value s′ such that all
honest parties output s′ at the end of the reconstruction phase. ♦
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We stress that if all honest parties Pi output fi = 0 at the end of the sharing
phase, then no guarantees are provided; e.g., honest parties may output different
values at the end of the reconstruction phase, or the malicious parties may learn the
dealer’s secret in the sharing phase.
The main result of this section is the following, which holds for any t < n/2:
Theorem 3.1.1 Assume there exists a VSS protocol Π tolerating t malicious par-
ties, such that the round complexities of its sharing phase and its reconstruction
phase are (s, sb) and (r, 0), respectively. Furthermore, assume there exists a grade-
cast protocol tolerating t malicious parties with round complexity (g, 0). Then, there
exists a moderated VSS protocol Π′ tolerating t malicious parties with the round
complexities of the sharing phase and reconstruction phase being (s + (2g − 1)sb, 0)
and (r, 0), respectively.
Proof We show how to “compile” Π so as to obtain the desired Π′. Essentially,
Π′ is constructed by replacing each broadcast in Π with two invocations of grade-
cast: one by the party who is supposed to broadcast the message, and one by the
moderator P ∗∗. In more detail, Π′ is defined as follows: At the beginning of the
protocol, all parties set their flag f to 1. The parties then run an execution of Π.
When a party P is directed by Π to send message m to P ′, it simply sends this
message. When a party P is directed by Π to broadcast a message m, the parties
run the following “broadcast emulation” subroutine:
1. P gradecasts the message m.
2. The moderator P ∗∗ gradecasts the message it output in the previous step.
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i) be the outputs of party Pi in steps 1 and 2, respectively.
Within the underlying execution of Π, party Pi will use m
′
i as the message
“broadcast” by P .
4. Furthermore, Pi sets fi := 0 if either (or both) of the following conditions
hold: (1) g′i 6= 2, or (2) m
′
i 6= mi and gi = 2.
Party Pi outputs fi at the end of the sharing phase, and outputs whatever it is
directed to output by Π at the end of the reconstruction phase.
It is easy to see that the round complexities of the sharing phase and recon-
struction phase of Π′ are (s + (2g − 1)sb, 0) and (r, 0), respectively. We now prove
that Π′ is a moderated VSS protocol tolerating t malicious parties. We first show
the completeness property, that is, if the moderator is honest during the sharing
phase then no party Pi ever sets fi := 0 when it is honest. To see this, note that if
P ∗∗ is honest then g′i = 2 each time the broadcast emulation subroutine is executed.
Furthermore, if Pi outputs some mi and gi = 2 in step 1 of that subroutine then,
by definition of gradecast, P ∗∗ also outputs mi in step 1. Hence m
′
i = mi and fi
remains 1.
To show the soundness property of moderated VSS, we first note that the
reconstruction phase of Π does not use broadcast. Thus the reconstruction phase of
Π′ is the same as that of Π. Now consider any execution of the broadcast emulation
subroutine during the sharing phase of Π′. We show that if there exists an honest
party Pi who holds fi = 1 upon completion of that subroutine, then the functionality
of broadcast was achieved (in that execution of the subroutine). It follows that if Pi
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holds fi = 1 at the end of the sharing phase, then Π
′ provided a faithful execution
of all broadcasts during the sharing phase of Π and so the functionality of VSS is
achieved.
If Pi holds fi = 1, then g
′
i = 2. (For the remainder of this paragraph, all
variables are local to a particular execution of the broadcast emulation subroutine.)
Since g′i = 2, the properties of gradecast imply that any honest party Pj holds
m′j = m
′
i and so all honest parties agree on the message that was “broadcast.”
Furthermore, if the “dealer” P (in the broadcast emulation subroutine) is honest
then gi = 2 and mi = m. So the fact that fi = 1 means that m
′
i = mi = m, and so
all honest parties use the message m “broadcast” by P in their underlying execution
of Π.
By applying the above theorem to the VSS protocol of Lemma 2.2.3 (resp.,
the authenticated VSS protocol of Lemma 2.2.5) and the gradecast protocol of
Lemma 2.2.1 (resp., the authenticated gradecast protocol of Lemma 2.2.2), we ob-
tain:
Corollary 3.1.2 There exists a moderated VSS protocol tolerating t < n/3 mali-
cious parties with round complexity of the sharing phase and reconstruction phase
being (12, 0) and (1, 0) respectively.
Corollary 3.1.3 There exists an authenticated moderated VSS protocol tolerating
t < n/2 malicious parties with round complexity of the sharing phase and recon-
struction phase being (12, 0) and (1, 0) respectively.
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3.1.1 From Moderated VSS to Oblivious Leader Election
In this section, we construct an oblivious leader election (OLE) protocol based
on any moderated VSS protocol. The following definition of oblivious leader election
is adapted from [FG03]:
Definition 5 (Oblivious leader election): A two-phase protocol for parties P1, . . . ,
Pn−1, Pn is an oblivious leader election protocol with fairness δ tolerating t malicious
parties if each honest party Pi outputs a value vi ∈ [n], and the following condition
holds with probability at least δ (over random coins of the honest parties) for any
adversary controlling at most t parties:
There exists a j ∈ [n] such that (1) each honest party Pi outputs vi = j,
and (2) Pj was honest at the end of the first phase.
If the above event happens, then we say an honest leader was elected. ♦
If the adversary is static, then we can define an oblivious leader election pro-
tocol as a single-phase protocol: with constant probability, all honest parties output
a common value j such that Pj is honest. However, if the adversary is adaptive,
then the adversary can corrupt Pj as soon as the value of j is known. Thus, in our
definition, we only require Pj to be honest up to a certain point (i.e., the end of the
first phase).
Intuitively, in our construction of OLE, a random coin ci ∈ [n
4] is generated for
each party Pi. This is done by having each party Pj select a random value cj,i ∈ [n
4]
and then share this value using moderated VSS with Pi acting as moderator. The
cj,i are then reconstructed and ci is computed as ci =
∑
j cj,i mod n
4. An honest
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party then outputs i minimizing ci. Since moderated VSS (instead of VSS) is used,
each party Pk may have a different view regarding the value of the {ci}. However:
• If Pi is honest then (by the properties of moderated VSS) all honest parties
reconstruct the same values cj,i (for any j) and hence compute an identical
value for ci.
• If Pi is dishonest but there exists an honest party Pj such that Pj outputs
fj = 1 in all invocations of moderated VSS where Pi acts as the moderator,
then (by the properties of moderated VSS) all honest parties compute an
identical value for ci.
Relying on the above observations, we devise a way such that all honest parties
output the same i (such that Pi is furthermore honest) with constant probability.
Theorem 3.1.4 Assume there exists a moderated VSS protocol tolerating t mali-





t malicious parties. Specifically, if n ≥ 3 and t < n/2 then δ ≥ 1/2. In addition,
the round complexity of phase 1 (resp., phase 2) of the OLE protocol is equal to
the round complexity of the sharing phase (resp., the reconstruction phase) of the
moderated VSS protocol.
Proof Each party Pi begins with trusti,j = 1 for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Phase 1 Each party Pi chooses random ci,j ∈ [n
4] for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. The following is
executed n2 times in parallel for each ordered pair (i, j):
52
All parties execute the sharing phase of a moderated VSS protocol
in which Pi acts as the dealer with initial input ci,j, and Pj acts as
the moderator. If a party Pk outputs fk = 0 in this execution, then
Pk sets trustk,j := 0.
Upon completion of the above, let trustk
def
= {j : trustk,j = 1}.
Phase 2 The reconstruction phase of the moderated VSS protocol is run n2 times
in parallel to reconstruct the secrets previously shared. Let cki,j denote Pk’s
view of the value of ci,j. (If a reconstructed value lies outside [n
4], then cki,j is







4, and outputs j ∈ trustk that minimizes c
k
j .










there exists a Pi that was honest at the end of phase 1








If Pi was honest in phase 1, then i ∈ trusted. Furthermore, by the properties of
moderated VSS, if k ∈ trusted then for any honest Pi, Pj and any 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, we
have ciℓ,k = c
j




k; thus, we may freely omit the superscript in this




ℓ :Pℓ malicious in phase 1 cℓ,k mod n
4 (this is the contribution to ck of the
parties that are malicious in phase 1), and let Pi be a party that was honest in
phase 1. Since k ∈ trusted, the properties of VSS hold for all secrets {cℓ,k}
n
ℓ=1 and
thus c′k is independent of ci,k. (If we view moderated VSS as being provided uncon-
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ditionally, independence holds trivially. When this is instantiated with a protocol
for moderated VSS, independence follows from the information-theoretic security of
moderated VSS [KLR06].) It follows that ck is uniformly distributed in [n
4].
By union bound, with probability at least 1 − 1
n2
, all coins {ck : k ∈ trusted}
are distinct. Conditioned on this event, with probability at least n−t
n
the party with
the minimum cj among the set trusted corresponds to a party which was honest in
phase 1. This concludes the proof.
Combining Theorem 3.1.4 with Corollaries 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, we obtain:
Corollary 3.1.5 There exists a OLE protocol with fairness 2/3 tolerating t < n/3
malicious parties, with the round complexities of phase 1 and phase 2 being (12, 0)
and (1, 0) respectively. (Note that when n < 4 the result is trivially true.)
Corollary 3.1.6 There exists an authenticated OLE protocol with fairness 1/2 tol-
erating t < n/2 malicious parties, with the round complexities of phase 1 and phase 2
being (12, 0) and (1, 0) respectively. (Note that when n < 3 the result is trivially
true.)
3.2 From Oblivious Leader Election to Broadcast
In this section, we construct broadcast protocols from oblivious leader election.
In section 3.2.1, we give the construction for the case t < n/3. In section 3.2.2, we
give the construction for the authenticated setting (t < n/2). We note that our
protocols do not provide simultaneous termination (i.e., parties may terminate the
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protocol at different rounds). The round complexity of a protocol is defined to be
the round in which the last honest party terminates.
3.2.1 The Case of t < n/3
We consider the unauthenticated case (i.e., t < n/3) in this section. We
construct a broadcast protocol for binary values based on oblivious leader election.
This also serves as a warmup for the authenticated case.
Theorem 3.2.1 If there exists a OLE protocol with fairness δ tolerating t < n/3
malicious parties and the round complexities of phase 1 and phase 2 are (r1, 0) and
(1, 0) respectively, then there exists a broadcast protocol tolerating t malicious parties
that terminates in (expected) max{6, r1} + 1 + 6/δ rounds.
Proof We first describe a binary broadcast protocol that terminates in (expected)
1+(1+1/δ)(6+r1) rounds. Later, we will show how to improve its round complexity
to (expected) max{6, r1} + 1 + 6/δ rounds.
Each party Pi uses two local binary variables: exitBAi and use leaderi. Both
variables are initially set to false.
Step 1 The dealer sends its input bit b to all parties. Let bi be the bit Pi receives
from the dealer.
Step 2 Each Pi sends bi to all parties. Let bj,i be the bit Pi receives from Pj. (When
this step is run at the outset of the protocol, a default value is used if Pi does
not receive anything from Pj . In subsequent iterations, if Pi does not receive
anything from Pj then Pi leaves bj,i unchanged.)
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Step 3 Each party Pi sets S
b
i := {j : bj,i = b} for b ∈ {0, 1}. If |S
0
i | ≥ t + 1, then
Pi sets bi := 0. If |S
0
i | ≥ n − t, then Pi sets exitBAi := true.
Each Pi sends bi to all parties. If Pi receives a bit from Pj, then Pi sets bj,i to
that value; otherwise, bj,i remains unchanged.
Step 4 Each party Pi defines S
b
i as in step 3. If |S
1
i | ≥ t + 1, then Pi sets bi := 1.
If |S1i | ≥ n − t, then Pi sets exitBAi := true.
Each Pi sends bi to all parties. If Pi receives a bit from Pj, then Pi sets bj,i to
that value; otherwise, bj,i remains unchanged.
If exitBAi = false, then Pi sets use leaderi := true.
Step 5 Each party Pi defines S
b
i as in step 3. If |S
0
i | ≥ t + 1, then Pi sets bi := 0.
If |S0i | ≥ n − t, then Pi sets use leaderi := false.
Each Pi sends bi to all parties. If Pi receives a bit from Pj, then Pi sets bj,i to
that value; otherwise, bj,i remains unchanged.
Step 6 Each party Pi defines S
b
i as in step 3. If |S
1
i | ≥ t + 1, then Pi sets bi := 1.
If |S1i | ≥ n − t, then Pi sets use leaderi := false.
Each Pi sends bi to all parties. If Pi receives a bit from Pj, then Pi sets bj,i to
that value; otherwise, bj,i remains unchanged.
Step 7 All parties execute the OLE protocol; let ℓi be the output of Pi. Each
Pi does the following: if use leaderi = true, then Pi sets bi := bℓi,i. If
exitBAi = true, then Pi outputs bi and terminates; otherwise, Pi goes to step
2.
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We refer to an execution of step 2 through 7 as an iteration. First we claim
that if an honest Pi sets exitBAi := true in step 3 or 4 of some iteration, then
all honest parties Pj hold bj = bi by the end of step 4 of that same iteration.
Consider the case when Pi sets exitBAi := true in step 3. (The case when Pi sets
exitBAi := true in step 4 is exactly analogous.) This implies that |S
0
i | ≥ n− t and
hence |S0j | ≥ n− 2t ≥ t + 1 and bj = 0. Since this holds for all honest players Pj, it
follows that in step 4 we have |S1j | ≤ t and so bj remains 1.
Next, we show that if — immediately prior to any given iteration — no honest
parties have terminated and there exists a bit b such that bi = b for all honest
Pi, then by the end of step 4 of that iteration all honest parties Pi hold bi = b
and exitBAi = true. This follows easily (by what we have argued in the previous
paragraph) once we show that there exists an honest party who sets exitBAi := true
while holding bi = b. Consider the case b = 0 (the case b = 1 is exactly analogous).
In this case |S0i | ≥ n − t in step 3 for any honest Pi. Thus, any honest Pi sets
exitBAi := true and holds bi = 0 by the end of this step.
Arguing exactly as in the previous two paragraphs, one can similarly show:
(i) If — immediately prior to any given iteration — there exists a bit b such that
bi = b for all honest Pi, then by the end of step 5 of that iteration all honest parties
Pi hold bi = b, exitBAi = true, and use leaderi = false (and hence all honest
parties output b and terminate the protocol in that iteration). (ii) If an honest party
Pi sets exitBAi := true in some iteration, then all honest parties Pj hold bj = bi
and use leaderj = false by the end of step 6 of that iteration. (iii) If an honest
party Pi sets use leaderi := false in some iteration, then all honest parties Pj
57
hold bj = bi by the end of step 6 of that same iteration.
Next, we show that if an honest party Pi outputs bi = b (and terminates) in
some iteration, then all honest parties output b and terminate by the end of the
next iteration. Note that if Pj fails to receive bi from Pi, then Pi,j is unchanged;
thus, if Pi terminates with output bi = b, it can be viewed as if Pi keeps on sending
bi = b in the next iteration. (In particular, note that Pi must have sent bi = b in
step 6.) Hence it suffices to show that by the end of the (current) iteration, bj = b
for all honest parties Pj . But this is implied by (ii), above.
Finally, we show that if an honest leader1 Pℓ is elected in step 7 of some
iteration, then all honest parties Pi terminate by the end of the next iteration.
By (i), it is sufficient to show that bi = bℓ,i = bℓ at the end of step 7 of the current
iteration. Consider two sub-cases: if all honest Pj hold use leaderj = true then
this is immediate. Otherwise, say honest Pi holds use leaderi = false. By (iii),
bℓ = bi at the end of step 6, and hence all honest parties Pj have bj = bi by the end
of step 7.
If the OLE protocol elects an honest leader with probability δ, then the ex-
pected number of iterations until a leader is elected is therefore at most 1/δ, and the
expected number of iterations is at most 1+1/δ. Steps 2–6 of each iteration require
only one round each, while in step 7 of an iteration the two phases of an OLE proto-
col are run. Thus the above protocol terminates in (expected) 1 + (1 + 1/δ)(6 + r1)
rounds.
1This implies that Pℓ was uncorrupted in step 6 of the iteration in question.
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We can, however, do better. The key observation is that the first phase of the
OLE protocol can be carried out in advance of step 7, and in particular can be carried
out in parallel with steps 1–6. (A similar observation was made in [Fel88].) Even
more, we can run multiple invocations of the first phase of the OLE protocol and




= ⌈r1/6⌉ executions of the first phase of the OLE protocol. These
are scheduled so that the final 6 rounds coincide with steps 1–6 of the first
iteration.
2. For the remainder of the protocol, continually run ℓ parallel executions of
the first phase of the OLE protocol in parallel with the “main” protocol.
These parallel executions will terminate every r1 rounds, just as the ℓ previous
executions get “used up.”
We now have a broadcast protocol that terminates in (expected) max{6, r1}
+1 + 6/δ rounds.
Ben-Or and El-Yaniv [BE03] showed how to transform a binary broadcast
protocol into a (multi-valued) broadcast protocol. While their solution is simple, it
incurs overhead on the round complexity. On the other head, parallel composition
(see Section 3.3) can be used to transform a binary broadcast protocol into a (multi-
valued) broadcast protocol without using any additional rounds (though the solution
is more complicated). In combination with the above theorem and Corollary 3.1.5,
we now have:
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Corollary 3.2.2 There exists a broadcast protocol tolerating t < n/3 adaptive cor-
ruptions that terminates in (expected) 22 rounds.
3.2.2 The Authenticated Case (t < n/2)
We consider the authenticated case (t < n/2) in this section.
Theorem 3.2.3 If there exists an authenticated OLE protocol with fairness δ tol-
erating t < n/2 malicious parties and the round complexities of phase 1 and phase
2 are (r1, 0) and (1, 0) respectively, then there exists a broadcast protocol tolerating
t malicious parties that terminates in (expected) max{7, r1} + 8 + 7/δ rounds.
Proof We start by constructing a broadcast protocol that terminates in (ex-
pected) 1 + (2 + 1/δ)(7 + r1) rounds. Later, we show how to improve its round
complexity to (expected) max{7, r1} + 8 + 7/δ rounds.
Let V be the domain of possible input values, let φ ∈ V be some default value
and let ⊥ be some special value that is not in V . Each Pi begins with an internal
variable Iteration lefti set to ∞. To avoid having to say this every time, we make
the implicit requirement that if Iteration lefti 6= ∞ then the value of vi is “locked”
and remains unchanged (i.e., even if the protocol description below says to change
it).
We say that Pi has a (valid) certificate for v if v ∈ V and there exist k > n/2
distinct indices j1, . . . , jk such that Pi holds σj1,i, . . . , σjk,i which are valid signatures
on v with respect to the public keys of Pj1 , . . . , Pjk . In this case, we will also call
(v, j1, . . . , jk, σj1,i, . . . , σjk,i) a certificate for v.
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Step 1 The dealer sends its input value to all parties. Let vi be the value Pi receives
from the dealer.
Step 2 Party Pi computes a signature σi of vi and sends (vi, σi) to all parties.
Step 3 Let (vj,i, σj,i) be the message received by party Pi from Pj. If these mes-
sages yield a certificate for vi, then Pi sends a certificate for vi to all parties.
Otherwise Pi sends nothing and sets vi :=⊥.
Step 4 If in the previous round Pi received a valid certificate for some v
∗ 6= vi, then
Pi sets vi :=⊥.
If vi 6=⊥, then Pi computes a signature
2 σ′i of vi and sends (vi, σ
′
i) to all parties.
Step 5 Let (vj,i, σ
′
j,i) be the message received by party Pi from Pj (if any) in the
previous round. If these messages yield a certificate for vi, then Pi sends a
certificate for vi to all parties and sets Iteration lefti := 1; otherwise Pi sends
nothing and sets vi :=⊥.
Step 6 If in the previous round Pi received a valid certificate on some value v
∗,
then Pi sends a certificate on v
∗ to all parties and sets vi := v
∗. Otherwise, Pi
sends nothing and sets vi :=⊥.
Step 7 If in the previous round Pi received a valid certificate on some value v
∗,
then Pi sends v
∗ to all parties; otherwise, Pi sends ⊥ to all parties. Let v
∗
j,i be
the value Pi received from Pj in this round.
2The current round number is also signed to distinguish this signature from others.
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Step 8 All parties execute the OLE protocol; let ℓi be the output of Pi. If vi =⊥
and v∗ℓi,i 6=⊥, then Pi sets vi := v
∗
ℓi,i
. If vi = v
∗
ℓi,i
=⊥, then Pi sets vi :=
φ. If Iteration lefti = 0, then Pi outputs vi and terminates the protocol. If
Iteration lefti = 1, then Pi sets Iteration lefti := 0 and goes to step 2. If
Iteration lefti = ∞, then Pi goes to step 2.
We refer to an execution of steps 2 through 8 as an iteration. We first claim
that if — immediately prior to any given iteration — there exists a value v such that
vi = v for all honest Pi and no honest parties have yet terminated, then all honest
parties will terminate and output v by the end of the following iteration. (This in
particular proves the correctness of the protocol for the case of an honest dealer.)
To see this, note that in this case all honest parties Pi compute a signature σi of
v and send (v, σi) to all parties in step 2. In step 3, the messages received by an
honest party yield a certificate for v, thus all honest parties send a certificate for v
to all parties. In step 4, an honest Pi receives a valid certificate for v, it computes
a signature σ′i of v and sends (v, σi) to all parties. In step 5, the messages received
by an honest party yield a certificate for v, and an honest Pi sets Iteration lefti := 1.
Thus all honest parties will terminate and output v by the end of the next iteration.
Now consider the first iteration in which an honest party Pi sets Iteration lefti
:= 1 (in step 5). We claim that, by the end of that iteration, vj = vi for all honest
Pj and no honest parties will have yet terminated. The claim regarding termination
is immediate since honest parties do not terminate until the iteration following
the one in which they set Iteration left := 1 (and we are considering the first such
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iteration). As for the first property, we make an observation that at any given step
there is at most one value v ∈ V for which some honest party has a certificate on v
(otherwise, some honest party must have signed two different values; but this cannot
occur). It then follows that any honest party Pj setting Iteration leftj := 1 in this
iteration must also hold vj = vi. For an honest party Pj holding Iteration leftj = ∞
after step 5, since Pi sends a certificate for vi to all parties (in step 5) the earlier
observation again implies that Pj sets vj := vi in step 6. Since vj = vi 6=⊥ (else Pi
would not have set Iteration lefti := 1), Pj will not change the value of vj in step 8.
This establishes the claim, and implies that if any honest party terminates then all
honest parties terminate with the same output.
To complete the proof that the above protocol is a broadcast protocol, we show
that if an honest leader Pℓ is elected in some iteration then all honest parties will
hold the same value v by the end of that iteration. By what we have argued in the
previous paragraph, we only need to consider the case where Iteration lefti = ∞ for
all honest Pi in step 8. If vi =⊥ for all honest Pi by the end of step 6, the claim is
immediate since every honest Pi will change their value of vi to the honest leader’s
value (or φ, as appropriate) in step 8. Otherwise, vi 6=⊥ by the end of step 6 for
some honest party Pi. By the observation mentioned earlier, every honest party Pj
holds vj ∈ {vi,⊥} by the end of step 6. Furthermore, Pℓ receives a valid certificate
on vi from Pi in step 6 and so (again using the earlier observation) sends v
∗
ℓ = vi to
all parties in step 7. Hence every honest party Pj holds vj = vi by the end of that
iteration.
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If the OLE protocol has fairness δ, then the expected number of iterations
until an honest leader is elected is therefore at most 1/δ, and the expected number
of iterations is 2 + 1/δ. Steps 2-7 of each iteration require one round each, while in
step 8 of an iteration the two phases of an OLE protocol are run. Thus the above
protocol terminates in (expected) 1 + (2 + 1/δ)(7 + r1) rounds.
As in the proof of Theorem 3.2.1, we can do better by executing the first phase
of the OLE protocol in advance of step 8, and then running multiple invocations
of the first phase of the OLE protocol and “saving them” until needed. We then
obtain the following broadcast protocol:
1. Run ℓ
def
= ⌈r1/7⌉ executions of the first phase of the OLE protocol. These
are scheduled so that the final 7 rounds coincide with steps 1–7 of the first
iteration.
2. For the remainder of the protocol, continually run ℓ parallel executions of
the first phase of the OLE protocol in parallel with the “main” protocol.
These parallel executions will terminate every r1 rounds, just as the ℓ previous
executions get “used up.”
Thus, we now have a broadcast protocol that can terminate in (expected)
max{7, r1} + 8 + 7/δ rounds.
In combination with the above Theorem and Corollary 3.1.6, we now have:
Corollary 3.2.4 There exists an authenticated broadcast protocol tolerating t < n/2
adaptive corruptions that terminates in (expected) 34 rounds.
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3.3 Parallel and Sequential Composition
Suppose we have a protocol Π that is designed under the assumption that a
broadcast channel is available; when run in a point-to-point network, one approach
is to replace each invocation of the broadcast channel in Π with an invocation of an
expected constant-round (authenticated) broadcast protocol bc; i.e., to set Π′ = Πbc.
However, there are two subtle problems with this approach that must be dealt with:
Parallel composition. In protocol Π, all n parties may access the broadcast
channel in the same round; this results in n parallel executions of bc in protocol
Πbc. Although the expected round complexity of each execution of bc is constant,
the expected number of rounds for all n executions of bc to terminate may no longer
be constant.
A general technique for handling this issue is proposed by [BE03]; their solution
is somewhat complicated. In our case, however, we may rely on an idea of Fitzi and
Garay [FG03] that applies to OLE-based protocols such as ours. The main idea is
that when multiple broadcast sub-routines are run in parallel, only a single leader
election (per iteration) is required for all these sub-routines. Using this approach,
the expected round complexity for n parallel executions will be identical to the
expected round complexity of a single execution.
Sequential composition. A second issue is that protocol bc does not provide
simultaneous termination. (As noted in [LLR02], this is inherent for any expected
constant-round broadcast protocol.) This may cause problems for sequential execu-
tions of bc within Πbc, since subsequent executions of bc may not have all honest
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parties starting at the same round. As an example of what can go wrong, assume
some protocol Π (that relies on a broadcast channel) requires some party Pi to
broadcast values in rounds 1 and 2. Let bc1, bc2 denote the corresponding invoca-
tions of broadcast within the composed protocol Πbc (which runs in a point-to-point
network). Then, because honest parties in bc1 do not terminate in the same round,
honest parties may begin execution of bc2 in different rounds. But security of bc2
is no longer guaranteed in this case!
At a high level, we can fix this by making sure that bc2 remains secure as
long as all honest parties begin execution of bc2 within a certain number of rounds.
Specifically, if honest parties are guaranteed to terminate bc1 within g rounds of
each other, then bc2 should remain secure as long as all honest parties start within
g rounds. We now show how to achieve this for an arbitrary number of sequential
executions of bc, without blowing up the round complexity too much.
Let rc(Π) denote the (expected) round complexity of a protocol Π.3 The
staggering gap of Π is defined as follows:
Definition 6 A protocol Π has staggering gap g = gap(Π) if any honest parties
Pi, Pj are guaranteed to terminate Π within g rounds of each other.
We begin with the following result by Lindell, et al. [LLR02, Lemma 3.1]:
Lemma 3.3.1 Let bc be a protocol for (authenticated) broadcast with staggering
gap g and expected round complexity r. Then for any constant c ≥ 0 there exists a
3Recall that the round complexity of a run of a protocol having a non-zero staggering gap is
the round in which the last honest party terminates.
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protocol Expand′c(bc) which achieves (authenticated) broadcast as long as all honest
parties begin execution of Expand′c(bc) within c rounds of each other. Expand
′
c(bc)
has expected round complexity (2c + 1) · r and staggering gap c + g · (2c + 1).
Next, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3.3.2 Let bc be a protocol for (authenticated) broadcast. Then for any
constant c ≥ 0 there exists a protocol Expandc(bc) which achieves the same security
as bc as long as all honest parties begin execution of Expandc(bc) within c rounds of
each other. Furthermore,
rc (Expandc(bc)) = (2c + 1) · rc(bc) + 1,
and the staggering gap of Expandc(bc) is 1 (as long as all honest parties begin exe-
cution within c rounds of each other).
This result holds unconditionally for the case of t < n/3 malicious parties, and
under the assumption of a PKI and secure digital signatures for t < n/2. 4
Proof We describe protocol Expandc(bc). Each party Pi executes Expand
′
c(bc).
When Pi terminates execution of Expand
′
c(bc) with output vi, it sends “exit, vi”
to all parties (along with a signature of this message in the authenticated case).
Furthermore, at every round (including during execution of Expand′c(bc)), Pi does
the following:
Unconditional case: If there exists a value v such that Pi has received “exit, v”
from t + 1 distinct parties, then Pi sends “exit, v” to all parties.
4We note that our solution for the unconditional case is very similar to the solution by Ben-Or
and El-Yaniv [BE03], we include it for the sake of completeness.
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If Pi has received “exit, v” from 2t + 1 distinct parties (possibly including
itself), then it terminates Expandc(bc) with output v (even if its execution of
Expand′c(bc) has not yet completed).
Authenticated case: If there exists a value v such that Pi has received valid sig-
natures from t+1 distinct parties (possibly including itself) on “exit, v,” then
Pi forwards “exit, v” along with these t + 1 signatures to all parties and ter-




We first show that Expandc(bc) has staggering gap 1. Let round k be the first
round in which some honest party Pi terminates Expandc(bc) with output v. Then:
Unconditional case: When Pi terminates Expandc(bc) in round k, it has received
2t+1 copies of “exit, v,” at least t+1 of which are from honest parties. Hence
all honest parties have received at least t + 1 copies of “exit, v” by round k
and have sent “exit, v” by round k + 1. Since there are at least 2t + 1 honest
parties, it follows that all honest parties receive 2t +1 copies of “exit, v” (and
hence terminate Expandc(bc)) by round k + 1.
Authenticated case: When Pi terminates Expandc(bc) in round k, it has received
t + 1 valid signatures on “exit, v” which it forwards to all parties. Hence all
honest parties receive the forwarded signatures in round k + 1 and terminate
by that round.
To conclude the proof, we show that Expandc(bc) achieves (authenticated)
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broadcast. It is easy to see that all honest parties output the same value. Further-
more, note that no honest party terminates Expandc(Π) until some honest party
has terminated Expand′c(Π). Since Expand
′
c(bc) achieves (authenticated) broadcast,
when the dealer is honest any honest players who run Expand′c(bc) to completion
will output the dealer’s message (in Expand′c(bc)). It follows that when the dealer is
honest all honest players will output the dealer’s message (in Expandc(bc)).
We remark that this proof does not apply to arbitrary protocols (rather, we
have explicitly stated the lemma only for protocols achieving broadcast) since we
use the fact that all honest parties should terminate with identical outputs.
We claim that combining the above two lemmas give a solution. To see this,
suppose we want to sequentially compose protocols bc1, . . . , bcℓ, each having stag-
gering gap g. We simply run ℓ sequential executions of bc′i = Expand1(bci) instead.
Each bc′i has staggering gap 1, meaning that honest parties terminate within 1 round
of each other. From the above lemma, each bc′i+1 is secure as long as honest parties
begin execution within 1 round of each other, so things are ok.
Applying this technique to compile a protocol Π (which uses a broadcast chan-
nel in each of its rc(Π) rounds) to a protocol Π′ (running in a point-to-point network),
we obtain
rc(Π′) = rc(Π) · (3 · rc(bc) + 1) .
In particular, if Π is a constant-round protocol and bc is an expected constant-round
broadcast protocol, then Π′ runs in an expected constant number of rounds.
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Chapter 4
Round-Efficient Secure Multiparty Computation
In this chapter, we construct constant-round secure multiparty computation
protocols that use only one round of broadcast. In Section 4.2, we consider the
case t < n/3 under the plain model (i.e., no setup assumption). In Section 4.3, we
consider the authenticated case t < n/2. Throughout the chapter, we assume the
existence of one-way functions.
4.1 Techniques and Overview
We give a high-level overview of the main techniques we use. Call (a, b, c),
where a, b, and c are elements of some field, a random multiplication triple if a
and b are uniformly distributed, each of a, b, c is shared among the parties,1 and
c = ab. Following the results in [BMR90, Bea91a, DI05], assuming the existence
of one-way functions, if in a “setup phase,” the parties share their inputs along
with sufficiently-many multiplication triples, then the parties can carry out secure
multiparty computation in a constant number of rounds without using any further
invocations of broadcast. Our task is thus reduced to showing how to perform the
necessary setup using only a single round of broadcast.
To achieve this, we use the concept of moderated protocols as introduced in
1For now, we do not specify the exact manner in which sharing is done.
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Section 3.1. Recall that in such protocols, there is a distinguished party Pm known as
the moderator. Given a protocol Π, designed under the assumption of a broadcast
channel, the moderated version of Π is a protocol Π′ that does not require any
invocation of broadcast and has the following properties (roughly speaking):
• At the end of Π′, each party Pi outputs a binary value trusti(m).
• If the moderator Pm is honest, then each honest party Pi outputs trusti(m) = 1.
This represents the fact that each honest party Pi “trusts” the moderator Pm.
• If any honest party Pi outputs trusti(m) = 1, then Π
′ achieves the functionality
of Π.
In Section 3.1, we have shown how to compile a VSS protocol into its moder-
ated version, while increasing the overall round complexity by at most a constant
multiplicative factor. (For t < n/3, the compilation does not require any assump-
tions; for n/3 ≤ t < n/2, the compilation assumes a PKI and digital signatures.) It
is not hard to verify that the proof extends for more general classes of functionalities.
Let Πi denote some constant-round protocol, designed assuming a broadcast
channel, that shares the input value of party Pi as well as sufficiently-many multi-
plication triples. Such protocols are constructed in, e.g., [BGW88, Rab94, Bea89,
GRR98, CDD+99, DI05]. We compile Πi into a moderated protocol Π
′
i where Pi
acts as the moderator. Now consider the following protocol that uses broadcast in
only a single round:
1. Run protocols {Π′i}
n




2. Each party Pi broadcasts {trusti(1), . . . , trusti(n)}.
3. A party Pi is disqualified if |{j : trustj(i) = 1}| ≤ t; i.e., if t or fewer players
broadcast trustj(i) = 1. If Pi is disqualified, then a default value is used as
the input for Pi.
4. Let i∗ be the minimum value such that Pi∗ is not disqualified. The set of
random multiplication triples that the parties will use is taken to be the set
that was generated in Π′i∗ .
Analyzing the above, note that if Pi is honest and there exists an honest majority,
then at least t + 1 parties broadcast trustj(i) = 1. Hence an honest Pi is never
disqualified. On the other hand, at least one of the parties that broadcast trustj(i
∗) =
1 must be honest. The properties of moderated protocols discussed earlier thus imply
that Π′i∗ achieves the functionality of Πi∗ . Since Πi∗ is assumed to securely share
sufficiently-many multiplication triples, it follows that the above protocol securely
shares sufficiently-many multiplication triples. A similar argument shows that the
inputs of all non-disqualified parties are shared appropriately. We conclude that
the above protocol implements the necessary setup phase using only one round of
broadcast.
In a naive compilation of Πi to Π
′
i (following Section 3.1), each round of broad-
cast in Πi is replaced by six rounds in Π
′
i for the case t < n/3, and eight rounds
for the authenticated case t < n/2. Proceeding directly thus yields secure MPC
protocols with relatively high round complexity: after all, existing constructions
of protocols Πi achieving the needed functionality do not attempt to minimize the
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number of rounds of broadcast. In the subsequent sections, we present instead a
new set of protocols that minimize their use of broadcast. Furthermore, our imple-
mentation of the setup phase deviates from the above simplified approach in order
to further optimize the round complexity of the final protocol.
4.2 The Case of t < n/3
Roadmap Using the VSS protocol given in Section 2.2.2.1, we can generate two
random values a and b: (i) each party Pi picks two random values ai and bi, shares it
using the sharing phase of the VSS protocol (ii) the parties reconstruct the values a1,








i bi. However, the properties
guaranteed by a VSS protocol are not strong enough to share random multiplication
triples. In Section 4.2.1, we extend the definitions of VSS to what we call VSS with
2(3)-level sharing and construct protocols that satisfy the extended definitions. In
Section 4.2.2, using VSS with 2(3)-level sharing, we construct a protocol that shares
random multiplication triples. Finally, in Section 4.2.3, we implement the setup
phase using one round of broadcast and then we show a constant-round secure
multiparty computation protocol without additional invocation of broadcast.
4.2.1 Generalized Secret Sharing and VSS
Throughout, we assume a finite field F of characteristic 2 which contains all
values s we are interested in, [n] (interpreted appropriately) as a subset. We start
by defining different levels of secret sharing.
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Definition 7 (1-level sharing): We say a value s has been 1-level shared if there
exists a polynomial Fs(x) with degree at most t such that (1) Fs(0) = s and (2) party
Pi holds the share si
def
= Fs(i). In this case, we say that Fs(x) 1-level shares s, or
alternatively, s is 1-level shared by Fs(x).
Note that if sa, sb are 1-level shared by the polynomials Fsa(x) and Fsb(x)
respectively, then for any publicly-known α, β ∈ F the value αs + βs′ is 1-level
shared as well. To see this, observe that αFsa(x) + βFsb(x) is a polynomial with
degree at most t, αFsa(0) + βFsb(0) = αsa + βsb and each Pi can compute the value
αFsa(i) + βFsb(i).
Definition 8 (2-level sharing): We say a value s has been 2-level shared if
(1) There exists a polynomial Fs(x) of degree at most t that 1-level shares s.
(2) For i ∈ [n], the value si
def
= Fs(i) has been 1-level shared by the polynomial
Fsi(x).
(3) Each honest party Pi knows the polynomial Fsi(x).
♦
Note that if s has been 2-level shared, then s has been 1-level shared as well.
Definition 9 (3-level sharing): We say a value s has been 3-level shared if
(1) There exists a polynomial Fs(x) of degree at most t that 1-level shares s.
(2) For i ∈ [n], the value si
def
= Fs(i) has been 2-level shared; in particular, this
implies si is 1-level shared by a polynomial Fsi(x).
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(3) Each party Pi knows the polynomial Fsi(x).
♦
Note that if s has been 3-level shared, then s has been 2-level shared as well.
Also note that if both sa, sb have been 3-level shared, then for any publicly-known
α, β ∈ F the value αs+βs′ is 3-level shared as well. We now generalize the definition
of VSS (cf. Definition 3) as follows:
Definition 10 (Generalized verifiable secret sharing): A two-phase protocol for
parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a distinguished dealer P
∗ ∈ P holds initial input s,
is a VSS protocol with 2-level (resp., 3-level) sharing tolerating t malicious parties
if the following conditions hold for any adversary controlling at most t parties:
Validity By the end of the first phase, some value s′ is 2-level (resp., 3-level) shared.
Moreover, if the dealer is honest then s′ = s.
Secrecy If the dealer is honest during the first phase (the sharing phase), then at
the end of this phase the joint view of the malicious parties is independent of
the dealer’s input s.
Reconstruction All honest parties will output s′ at the end of the reconstruction
phase. ♦
Next, we construct VSS protocols with 2(3)-level sharing. If s is 1-level shared,
and t < n/3, then the parties can reconstruct s in one round: each party Pi sends
Fs(i) to all other parties, and then each party obtains the polynomial Fs(x) (and
hence s
def
= Fs(0)) by applying Reed-Solomon error-correction [RS60] to the received
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values. Therefore, we focus on constructing the sharing phase of the VSS protocols.
We first construct a VSS protocol with 2-level sharing; then, based on this protocol,
we construct a VSS protocol with 3-level sharing.
Lemma 4.2.1 There exists a VSS protocol with 2-level sharing tolerating t < n/3
malicious parties such that the round complexity of its sharing phase is (7, 1).
Proof We observe that the VSS protocol given in Lemma 2.2.3 is in fact a VSS
protocol with 2-level sharing, as long as a default value s′ is 2-level shared when
the (corrupted) dealer is disqualified. Secrecy follows directly from the definition
of VSS. We now argue validity. Following the proof in Lemma 2.2.3, by the end
of the sharing phase, as long as the dealer has not been disqualified, there exists
a bivariate degree-t polynomial F ′(x, y), such that each Pi holds the polynomials
gi(x)
def
= F ′(x, i), hi(y)
def
= F ′(i, y). Hence the value F ′(0, 0) is 2-level shared since:
• Each Pi knows F
′(0, i) = gi(0), so F
′(0, 0) is 1-level shared by the polynomial
F ′(0, y)
• For i ∈ [n], the value F ′(0, i) has been 1-level shared by the polynomial gi(x) =
F ′(x, i), as each Pj knows the value gi(j) = F
′(j, i) = hj(i)
• Pi knows the polynomial gi(x)
Moreover, if the dealer is honest, then F ′(0, 0) = s. Thus validity holds.
We now move on to construct a VSS protocol with 3-level sharing:
Lemma 4.2.2 There exists a VSS protocol with 3-level sharing tolerating t < n/3
malicious parties such that the round complexity of its sharing phase is (8, 1).
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Proof The idea of our construction is as follows: using the sharing phase of a VSS
protocol with 2-level sharing, the dealer shares the secret s, as well as n values g1,
. . . , gn such that gi = fs(i) for all i ∈ [n], where fs(x) is the polynomial that 1-level
shares s. To enable Pi to reconstruct the polynomial Fgi(x) that 1-level shares gi,
each party Pj sends its share Fgi(j) to Pi afterwards, then Pi applies Reed-Solomon
error correction to reconstruct the polynomial. If the dealer is honest, then s would
have been 3-level shared. However, a corrupted dealer can cheat by sharing a value
gi 6= fs(i). To prevent this from happening, the parties reconstruct the values
{gi − fs(i)} and check if all of them are equal to 0. Note that this is possible since
both gi and fs(i) have been 1-level shared.
We give the protocol specification below. When we say the dealer is disqualified
we mean that execution of the protocol halts, and a default value s′ is 3-level shared
(via some default polynomials). We use the VSS protocol Π given in Lemma 4.2.1 as
a building block for the following reason: the dealer gets to choose the polynomial
that shares the secret prior to any message exchange. This enables us to run the
n + 1 invocations of the sharing phase in parallel.
Step 1 The dealer shares s using the sharing phase of the VSS protocol Π. Let fs(y)
be the polynomial that 1-level shares s. The dealer shares g1
def
= fs(1), . . . , gn
def
=
fs(n) using n additional invocations of the sharing phase of Π.
Step 2 If the dealer is disqualified in any invocation of the sharing phase in the
previous step, then it is disqualified. Otherwise, s, g1, . . . , gn have been 2-
level shared. Let fsi(x) be the polynomial that 1-level shares fs(i), and let
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gi(x) be the polynomial that 1-level shares gi. For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, each Pi sends
di,j
def
= fsj (i) − gj(i) to all parties; Pi also sends gj(i) to Pj .
Output determination Let d1(x), . . . , dn(x) be the degree-t polynomials result-
ing from applying Reed-Solomon error-correction to {d1,1, . . . , dn,1}, . . . , {d1,n,
. . . , dn,n}. If there exists a j ∈ [n] such that dj(0) 6= 0, then the dealer is dis-
qualified. We note that all parties have the same view on {dj(0)} since both
fsi(0) and gi(0) have been 1-level shared. Otherwise, Pi computes the polyno-
mial gi(x) by applying Reed-Solomon error-correction to the shares it received.
We first observe that the round complexity of the sharing phase of the above
protocol is (8, 1): The round complexity of step 1 is (7, 1) and step 2 takes one
round.
We first prove secrecy. For the rest of this paragraph, assume the dealer is
honest. Following the secrecy property of the underlying VSS protocol with 2-level
sharing, if Pi is honest, then the adversary does not learn any new information
about fs(i) when the dealer shares gi
def
= fs(i) using VSS. On the other hand, if Pi
is corrupted, then the adversary already knows the value of fs(i) and thus it does
not learn any additional information when the dealer shares gi. Hence the view of
the adversary remains independent of s after step 1. If the dealer is honest, then
di(0) = 0. Learning the polynomial di(x) in step 2 does not give the adversary any
additional information about gi.
Next, we prove validity. It is easy to see that an honest dealer will not be
disqualified. Thus the value s is 3-level shared. Now consider a dealer who is not
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disqualified (the case of a disqualified malicious dealer is trivial). In this case, d1(0)
= . . . = dn(0) = 0. Hence fsi(0) = gi for all i. Thus fs(0) has been 3-level shared
since:
• fs(0) is 1-level shared by the polynomial fs(x).
• For i ∈ [n], gi = fs(i) has been 2-level shared.
• Let gi(x) be the polynomial 1-level sharing gi. Pi knows the polynomial gi(x)
as Pi reconstructs it in the output determination step.
4.2.2 Generating Random Multiplication Triples
In this section, we construct a (17, 3)-round protocol for generating random
multiplication triples. (We describe the protocol for generating one such triple, but
it can be parallelized to generate as many as needed.) Specifically, at the end of the
protocol there will exist three values a, b, c such that:
1. a, b, and c are 1-level shared.
2. c = ab.
3. Given the view of the adversary, a and b are uniformly distributed in F.
We then use a technique from [FGG+06] to reduce the round complexity of the
protocol to (11, 3).
We start by recalling the following technical lemma concerning multiplication
of shares [GRR98]:
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Lemma 4.2.3 Let A(x), B(x) be two polynomials of degree at most t, and α1, . . . ,
α2t+1 ∈ F distinct elements. Then A(0) · B(0) =
∑2t+1
i=1 βi · A(αi) · B(αi) for some
constants β1, . . . , β2t+1 ∈ F.
On a high level, our protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Two random values a and b are shared among the parties such that the view
of the adversary is independent of a and b.
2. Let A(x) and B(x) be the polynomials that 1-level shares a and b respectively.
Pi shares the product of A(i) and B(i) and proves that the sharing is done
correctly. The method we use for proving is adapted from [BGW88]. The
high level idea is as follows: A(x)B(x) is a polynomial of degree 2t. Suppose
Pi shares a random polynomial F
(t)
i (x) of degree t with the leading coefficient




= A(x)B(x) − F
(t)
i (x)x
t is a poly-
nomial of degree 2t − 1; moreover, A(0)B(0) = G
(t)
i (0) and each honest party
Pj knows the value of G
(t)
i (j). Repeating the above process t − 1 times, we
will get a degree−t polynomial G
(1)
i (x) such that G
(1)
i (0) = A(0)B(0) and each
honest party Pj knows the value G
(1)
i (j).
However, if Pi is corrupted, then G
(1)
i (x) may not be a degree−t polynomial.
For instance, the leading coefficient of F
(t)
i (x) may not be equal to that of
A(x)B(x). To prevent the above from happening, Pi is required to share a
degree−t polynomial Gi(x) = G
(1)
i (x). Again, if Pi is corrupted, these two
polynomials may not be the same. But each honest party Pj can check if
Gi(j) is equal to G
(1)
i (j). If Gi(j) = G
(1)




i (x) is at most 2t, it then follows that Gi(x) = G
(1)
i (x).
3. Following Lemma 4.2.3, c has been shared as well.
We now give the details:
Step 1 Each party Pi shares two random values a
(i) and b(i) using the sharing phase
of a VSS protocol with 3-level sharing.
Step 2 Let a =
∑
i a
(i) and b =
∑
i b
(i). Note that both a and b have been 3-level
shared. Let A(x) and B(x) be the polynomials that 1-level share a and b
respectively. Notice that ai
def
= A(i) and bi
def
= B(i) have been 2-level shared,
and Pi knows the polynomial Ai(x) (respectively Bi(x)) that 1-level shares ai
(respectively bi). Let Di(x)
def
= Ai(x)Bi(x) = aibi + c1x + · · · + c2tx
2t. Each
Pi acts as the dealer in t + 1 (parallel) invocations of the sharing phase of the
VSS protocol in Lemma 4.2.1, but with the following modifications on how Pi
picks the random bivariate polynomials in the first round:
• In the 1st invocation, Pi picks the random bivariate polynomial such
that the coefficient of yt is equal to c2t. Let F
(t)
i (x, y) be the bivariate












• In the 2nd invocation, Pi picks the random bivariate polynomial such
that the coefficient of yt is equal to (c2t−1−rt,t−1). Let F
(t−1)
i (x, y) be the









rt−1,0 + rt−1,1y + · · · + rt−1,t−1y
t−1 + (c2t−1 − rt,t−1)y
t.
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• In the 3rd invocation, Pi picks the random bivariate polynomial such that
the coefficient of yt is equal to (c2t−2−rt,t−2−rt−1,t−1). Let F
(t−2)
i (x, y) be









rt−2,0 + rt−2,1y + · · · + rt−2,t−1y
t−1 + (c2t−2 − rt,t−2 − rt−1,t−1)y
t.
· · ·
• In the tth invocation, Pi picks the random bivariate polynomial such that
the coefficient of yt is equal to ct+1−rt,1−rt−1,2−· · ·−r2,t−1. Let F
(1)
i (x, y)









r1,0 + r1,1y + · · · + r1,t−1y
t−1 + (ct+1 − rt,1 − rt−1,2 − · · · − r2,t−1)y
t.
• In the (t + 1)th invocation, Pi picks the random bivariate polynomial
F
(0)
















i (y) is a polynomial of degree
at most t, see Claim 4.2.4).






i (j). Following the protocol specification in
Lemma 4.2.1, Pj knows these values; moreover, these values have been 1-level
shared. Let aj,i and bj,i be the 1-level shares held by Pj with respect to the
value ai and bi. Both aj,i and bj,i have been 1-level shared since ai and bi have
been 2-level shared. If the following equality does not hold:
d
(0)







then Pj broadcasts “complaint Pi”.





j,i , aj,i, bj,i, d
(1)
j,i , . . . , d
(ℓ)
j,i
The reconstruction is possible since all the above values have been 1-level
shared. The parties verify if the complaint by Pj is valid. If the complaint is
valid, then Pi is disqualified.
Output Determination Let T be the set of non-disqualified parties with the 2t+1
smallest identifier. It follows from Claim 4.2.5 that such T exists. It follows
from Claim 4.2.6 that for all Pi ∈ T , aibi has been 2-level shared. Following
Lemma 4.2.3, c = ab has been 2-level shared.
We first compute the round complexity of the above protocol. Step 1 invokes
the sharing phase of a VSS protocol with 3-level sharing. From Lemma 4.2.2, the
round complexity of this step is (8, 1). The round complexity of step 2 is (7, 1).
Step 3 requires one round of broadcast and step 4 requires one round of interaction.
Thus the round complexity of the above protocol is (17, 3).
We now proceed to analyze the above protocol.



























t + . . . + rt−1,t−1y




t−1 + . . . + rt−2,t−1y
2t−3 + (c2t−2 − rt,t−2 − rt−1,t−1)y
2t−2
− . . .
− r1,0y + r1,1y
2 + . . . + r1,t−1y
t + (ct+1 − rt,1 − rt−1,2 − . . . − r2,t−1)y
t+1
= (ct − rt,0 − rt−1,1 − . . . − r1,t−1)y
t
+ (ct−1 − rt−1,0 − rt−2,1 − . . . − r1,t−2)y
t−1
+ . . . + (c2 − r2,0 − r1,1)y
2 + (c1 − r1,0)y + aibi
Claim 4.2.5 If Pi remains honest by the end of the protocol, then Pi will not be
disqualified.
Proof It follows directly from the protocol specification.
Claim 4.2.6 If Pi is not disqualified, then D
(0)
i (0) = aibi and thus aibi has been
2-level shared.
Proof We will show that D
(0)





i (y). It then follows
that D
(0)
i (0) = Ai(0)Bi(0) = aibi. Assume D
(0)












i (y) is a polynomial of degree at most 2t and D
(0)
i (y)
is a polynomial of degree at most t, and there are at least 2t+1 honest parties, there
must exist an honest party Pj such that D
(0)











. . . , D
(t)
i (j), Ai(j), Bi(j) in step 4 and find that the complaint by Pj is valid. Pi
will be disqualified.
Following the above two claims, by the end of the protocol, there exist three
values a, b, and c such that c = ab and all three values have been 2-level shared.
What is left is to show that a, b are both randomly distributed from the view of the
adversary.
Claim 4.2.7 a and b are uniformly distributed given the view of the adversary.
Proof Note that if Pi is honest, then by the secrecy of VSS, the view of the
adversary is independent of a(i) and b(i) in step 1. Hence, a(j) and b(j) shared by a
malicious party Pj are independent of a
(i) and b(i). (This is so as a(j) and b(j) can be
reconstructed from the view of the adversary.) It follows that a and b are randomly
distributed after step 1.
We now show that the view of the adversary remains independent of a and
b throughout steps 2 – 4. The proof in Lemma 4.2.1 can be directly adapted to
show that, in step 2, in the first t invocations of the sharing phase of VSS in which
an honest Pi acts as the dealer, the view of the adversary is independent of the
coefficient of yt of the corresponding bivariate polynomials. Thus the adversary
does not gain any information in the first t invocations. Now consider the last
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((t+1)th) invocation. We claim that the view of the adversary remains independent
of F
(0)
i (0, 0) = Ai(0)Bi(0) after this invocation. If Pi is honest, then F
(0)






i (y). After the (t+1)
th invocation, the only information the
adversary learns about F
(0)
i (0, y) are the shares held by corrupted parties Pj (i.e.,
F
(0)
i (0, j)). However, the adversary can compute the value F
(0)





i (j) solely based on its view in the first t invocations. Thus the claim
holds.
In step three, an honest party will never complain against another honest
party. Hence the adversary does not learn any additional information in step four.
The round complexity of the above protocol is (17, 3). We can apply a tech-
nique from [FGG+06] to modify the protocol such that the round complexity is
reduced to (11, 3):
• In step 2 of the above protocol, Pi acts as the dealer in t+1 (parallel) invoca-
tions of the sharing phase of the VSS protocol in Lemma 4.2.1 except that Pi
picks the t + 1 random bivariate polynomials {F
(k)
i (x, y)} according to some
specified constraints.
• In the modified protocol, in step 1, Pi acts as the dealer in t + 1 (parallel)
invocations of the sharing phase of the VSS protocol in Lemma 4.2.1 with the
modification that Pi picks the t+1 random bivariate polynomials {R
(k)
i (x, y)}
completely at random; in step 2, Pi picks the t + 1 random bivariate polyno-
mials {F
(k)
i (x, y)} according to the specified constraints of the above protocol
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and broadcasts the bivariate polynomials {F
(k)
i (x, y) − R
(k)
i (x, y)}. Note that
a party can compute its shares of {F
(k)
i (x, y)} solely based on its shares of
{R
(k)
i (x, y)} and the bivariate polynomials {F
(k)
i (x, y) − R
(k)
i (x, y)}.
In the modified protocol, the adversary does not gain any additional informa-
tion. On the other hand, the round complexity of step 2 is now (1, 1) (instead of
(7, 1)). Thus, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2.8 There exists a protocol with round complexity (11, 3) tolerating t <
n/3 malicious parties that generates random multiplication triples.
4.2.3 Constant-Round MPC using One Round of Broadcast
In Section 4.2.3.1, we show how to implement the setup phase using one round
of broadcast. Based on this result, in Section 4.2.3.2, we show how to construct a
constant-round MPC protocol with round complexity (O(1), 1).
4.2.3.1 Implementing the Setup Phase with One Round of
Broadcast
By running in parallel the VSS protocol in Lemma 4.2.1 and the protocol for
generating random multiplication triples given in Section 4.2.2, we obtain a (11, 3)-
round protocol Πi that simultaneously allows a party Pi to share its input and
generate sufficiently-many random multiplication triples. We remark that, in the
resulting protocol, broadcast is invoked in the 7th, 9th and 10th rounds.
87




• By the end of the protocol, all honest parties output a common bit trust(i);
• If Pi is honest, then trust(i) = 1. Moreover, the view of the adversary remains
independent of Pi’s input.
• If trust(i) = 1, then Pi’s input as well as all the random multiplication triples
have been 2-level shared. Furthermore, given the view of the adversary, the
first two components of each multiplication triple (a, b, c) are uniformly dis-
tributed in the field F.
Π′i proceeds as follows: Each party Pj initializes a binary flag fj to 1. Roughly
speaking, the flag fj indicates whether Pj “trusts” Pi or not. The parties then run
an execution of Πi. When a party P is directed by Πi to send message m to another
party over a point-to-point channel, it simply sends this message. When a party P
is directed to broadcast a message m in the 7th or 9th round of Πi, all parties run
the following “simulated broadcast” sub-routine:
• P gradecasts the message m.
• Pi gradecasts the message it output in the previous step.




j) be the output of party Pj in step 1 and step 2,
respectively. Within the underlying execution of Πi, party Pj will use m
′
j as
the message “broadcast” by P . Furthermore, Pj sets fj := 0 if either (or both)
of the following conditions hold: (1)g′j 6= 2, or (2)m
′
j 6= mj and gj = 2.
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In the 10th round of Πi, when a party Pj is directed to broadcast a message m, it
simply broadcasts this message. In addition, Pj broadcasts the flag fj. If fewer
than 2t + 1 parties broadcast fj = 1, then all parties set trust(i) = 0; otherwise, all
parties set trust(i) = 1.
The compilation from Πi to Π
′
i is essentially the same as the compilation of VSS
to moderated VSS stated in Section 3.1, except that we retain the last invocation
of broadcast in Πi. The proof of correctness is also similar. We include the proof
below for the sake of completeness.
We now prove that Π′i achieves the claimed properties. Consider the case
that Pi is honest. No honest party Pj sets fj := 0. To see this, note that if Pi
is honest then g′j = 2 each time the simulated broadcast sub-routine is executed.
Furthermore, if Pj outputs some mj and gj = 2 in step 1 of that sub-routine then,
by definition of gradecast (see Definition 2), Pi also outputs mj in step 1. Hence
m′j = mj and fj remains 1. Therefore, at least 2t + 1 parties will broadcast f = 1
, and so Di = 1. The secrecy of the random multiplication triples following readily
from the security of Πi.
To show the third property, assume Di = 1. It implies that there exists at
least one honest party Pj who holds fj = 1 by the end of the protocol. Consider any
execution of the simulated broadcast subroutine. We show that the functionality of
broadcast was achieved in that execution. Since fj = 1, then g
′
j = 2. Since g
′
j = 2,





all honest parties agree on the message that was “broadcast”. Hence Π′i achieves
the functionality of Π.
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Note that although a malicious Pi can influence the value of trust(i) output
by the parties, the third property of Π′i implies that the influence is independent of
the values of the multiplication triples being shared.
Using the gradecast protocol in Lemma 2.2.1, two rounds of broadcast in Πi




The following implementation of the setup phase requires (21, 1)-rounds:
1. Run protocols {Π′i}
n
i=1 in parallel.
2. A party Pi is disqualified if trustj(i) 6= 1. If Pi is disqualified, then a default
value is used as the input for Pi.
3. Let i∗ be the minimum value such that Pi∗ is not disqualified. The set of
random multiplication triples that the parties will use is taken to be the set
that was generated in Π′i∗ .
4.2.3.2 The MPC Protocol
We start by reviewing the results from [Bea91a, DI05]. Then we show how to
obtain a constant-round MPC protocol using one round of broadcast by combining
their results and the result from the last section.
The following observation is due to Beaver [Bea91a]:
Lemma 4.2.9 Suppose a random multiplication triple (a, b, c) and two values x and
y have been 1-level shared. Then the value x · y can be 1-level shared after one round
of secret reconstruction.
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Proof We include the proof for the sake of completeness. The parties reconstruct
the values dx = x−a and dy = y− b. Then, in a non-interactive manner, each party
can compute its share of dxdy + dxb + dya + c (using its shares of a, b, c). Note that
since c = ab, we have dxdy + dxb + dya + c = xy. (Recall that the characteristic of
the field is 2.)
Assuming the existence of one-way functions, Damg̊ard and Ishai [DI05] give
a multiparty computation protocol with round complexity (O(1), O(1)). We review
their protocol in the Appendix A.1, but on a high level, their protocol ΠDI can be
summarized as follows:
Step 1 (In parallel) Each party shares some values in GF [2] using the sharing phase
of a VSS protocol such that these values will be 1-level shared.
Step 2 Parties compute shares of degree-3 polynomials in the already shared values
(over GF [2]).
Step 3 Based on the shares it obtained in the previous step, a party (locally)
computes some values and send these to other parties.
Step 4 A party constructs its output based on the values it received in the previous
step.
The protocol requires the values shared in step 1 to be in GF [2]. while the
VSS protocols that we have presented assume the values are from GF [2k] where
2k ≥ n. Our VSS protocols can still be used, but with an additional step: to ensure
that each shared value x is equal to 0 or 1, parties reconstruct x2 − x and verify
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that it is equal to 0 before proceeding to step 2. If the outcome is not zero, then
the corresponding party is disqualified and a default value for x is used.
Let K1 be the total number of bits shared by all parties in step 1 and K2 be
total number of multiplications needed to evaluate the polynomials in step 2. We
now present our MPC protocol:
Step 1 Using the protocol for implementing the setup phase as described in Sec-
tion 4.2.3.1, K1 + K2 random multiplication triples, as well as the required
values as stated in step 1 of ΠDI are 1-level shared.
Step 2 For every value x shared by a Pi, the parties reconstruct x
2−x. If x2−x 6= 0,
then Pi is disqualified. If Pi is disqualified, then a default value is used as the
value of x. Following Lemma 4.2.9, this can be done using two rounds of secret
reconstruction and consumes a random multiplication triple.
Step 3 Parties compute shares of degree-3 polynomials in the already shared values
over GF [2k].
Step 4 The parties continue the protocol as specified in step 3 and step 4 of ΠDI.
In the above protocol, step 1 requires 21 rounds and 1 round of broadcast.
Both step 2 and step 3 require 2 rounds. Step 4 requires 1 round. Thus, we have
the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2.10 Assuming the existence of one-way functions, there exists a se-
cure multiparty computation protocol tolerating t < n/3 malicious parties with round
complexity (26, 1).
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Following Corollary 3.2.2, this immediately gives a MPC protocol with (ex-
pected) round complexity (47, 0). However, we can do better. The protocol in
Theorem 4.2.10 does not use broadcast until the 21th round. In Section 3.2.1, we
have made the observation that some components of our broadcast protocol (in
particular, the first phase of an OLE protocol) can be carried out in advance even
before the values to be broadcast are known. This observation allows us to save 6
rounds of interaction. Thus, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 4.2.11 Assuming the existence of one-way functions, there exists a se-
cure multiparty computation protocol tolerating t < n/3 malicious parties with (ex-
pected) round complexity 41.
4.3 The Authenticated Case (t < n/2)
In this section, we assume a PKI and a secure digital signature scheme (which
can be constructed assuming the existence of one-way functions [Rom90]). On a
high level, the construction is similar to the case of t < n/3 with the following
differences:
1. Since t may be greater than n/3, we can no longer apply Reed-Solomon error
correction to reconstruct shared values. Thus, we no longer have the linearity
of VSS for free. To deal with this issue, we use the information checking tool
from [CDD+99]. Roughly speaking, the information checking tool enables us
to construct VSS protocols with linearity; moreover, the shares will be “au-
thenticated” (i.e., a corrupted party will not be able to forge an invalid share),
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so we no longer need error correction for secret reconstruction. Unfortunately,
the protocols as described in [CDD+99] require invocations of broadcast. We
show how to eliminate the usage of broadcast by utilizing the PKI.
2. The presence of a PKI enables us to “catch” a malicious party who cheats more
easily. For instance, if a malicious party Pi sends two contradicting messages
(with valid signatures) to Pj and Pk, then the latter two parties can conclude
that Pi is cheating upon exchange of messages. This allows us to construct
more round-efficient protocols.
3. As in the case of t < n/3 (see Section 4.2.2), in the protocol for sharing
a random multiplication triple (a, b, c), the parties first share two random
numbers a and b and then each party shares aibi (where ai and bi are the
shares held by Pi with respect to a and b) and proves that the correct value
has been shared. In order for the parties to compute their shares of c (by
applying Lemma 4.2.3), there should exist a set of 2t + 1 parties Pi that have
correctly shared aibi. For t < n/3, this condition is always satisfied since there
are at least 2t + 1 honest parties. However, if t < n/2, then in the worst case,
only t + 1 (honest) parties will correctly share the product of their shares.
Hence if a party does not share the product of its shares correctly, then an
additional step is need to make the corresponding shares public.
Roadmap In Section 4.3.1, we define and construct an information checking tool
that does not require broadcasting. In Section 4.3.2, we introduce the notion of
IC-signature (which can be readily constructed from information checking tool).
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Roughly speaking, IC-signature is like standard signature except that it has the
linearity property. Using such notion, in Section 4.3.3, we define and construct VSS
protocols with 2(3)-level sharing and IC-authentication. Shares generated by these
protocols have the linearity property and are “authenticated”. In Section 4.3.4,
using the above VSS protocols, we construct a protocol that generates random
multiplication triples, and then an authenticated MPC protocol that uses one round
of broadcast.
Throughout this section, we assume that each party Pi maintains a set of
binary variables {trusti,j} which are all initialized to 1. Our protocols are designed
such that whenever an honest Pi sets trusti,j = 0, with all but negligible probability,
Pj is malicious. For each triple (i, j, k), we assume that Pi and Pk share a common
secret αi,j,k 6= 0 6= 1 such that the view of the adversary is independent of it if both
Pi and Pk are honest. This can be achieved by having Pi picks and sends a random
value αi,j,k 6= 0 6= 1 to Pk at the beginning.
4.3.1 Information Checking Tool
We start by defining and constructing 2-cast protocol which then we will use
to construct the information checking tool.
Definition 11 (2-cast): A protocol for three parties where there are two receivers
Pi and Pj , and a distinguished sender holds initial input m, is a 2-cast protocol if
the following conditions hold for any adversary:
• All honest parties output the same message m′.
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• If the sender is honest, then m = m′. ♦
Lemma 4.3.1 There exists an authenticated 2-cast protocol with round complexity
(2, 0).
Proof It follows from observation that the following protocol is a 2-cast protocol:
Round 1 The sender signs and sends m to the two receivers Pi and Pj , and then
output m. Let (mi, σi) and (mj , σj) be the message and the signature received
by Pi and Pj respectively.
Round 2 The two receivers exchange the signature and the message they receive
in the first round.
• If mi = mj and σi and σj are both valid signatures of mi and mj , then
the receivers output mi;
• else if σi is a valid signature on mi but σj is not a valid signature on mj ,
then the receivers output mi;
• else if σj is a valid signature on mj but σi is not a valid signature on mi,
then the receivers output mj;
• else the receivers output a default message.
We now move on to present the definition of information checking tool. In an
information checking tool, there are 3 parties, the dealer, the intermediary and the
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recipient. Roughly speaking, the tool is a weaken version of a standard signature
scheme: after receiving a message from the dealer, the intermediary can forward the
message to the recipient and convince the recipient that the message is originated
from the dealer. However, the intermediary will not be able to convince an arbitrary
party (other than the recipient) that it has received such a message from the dealer.
This relaxed definition enables us to construct the tool with linearity property. The
formal definition (adapted from [CDD+99]) is given below.
Definition There are 3 parties, the dealer Pi, the intermediary Pj and the recipient
Pk. An information checking (IC) tool consists of three phases:
1. ICsend: all three parties take part in this phase. Pi hands a secret s to Pj and
some auxiliary data to both Pj and Pk. Pj accepts s or rejects s.
2. ICauth: all three parties take part in this phase. If Pj accepts s in ICsend, then
Pj ensures that (an honest) Pk will accept s in ICreveal.
3. ICreveal: only Pj and Pk take part in this phase. In this phase Pk receives a
value s′ from Pj , along with some auxiliary data. Pk either accepts s
′ or sets
trustk,j := 0.
The IC scheme has the following properties:
• Correctness:
– If Pi, Pj and Pk are honest, and Pi has a secret s, then Pi will accept s
in ICSend and Pj will accept s in ICreveal.
97
– If Pj and Pk are honest, and Pj accepts s in ICSend, then Pk will accept
s in ICreveal with all but negligible probability.
– If Pi and Pk are honest, then in ICreveal, with all but negligible probabil-
ity, Pk will not accept any value s
′ that is different from s.
– If an honest party Pk sets trustk,i = 0 (resp. trustk,j = 0) during the
execution of the scheme, then with all but negligible probability, Pi (resp.
Pj) is corrupted.
• Secrecy: If Pi and Pj are honest, then the view of Pk in the phases ICsend and
ICauth is independent of s.
• Linearity: Suppose Pi, Pj, Pk have executed ICsend and ICauth for two different
values s1 and s2. Pj can reveal βs1 + γs2 to Pk for some known constants β
and γ in ICreveal. ♦
Protocol Construction The protocol below is based on the protocol in [CDD+99].
Here, by utilizing the PKI, we are able to avoid using broadcast and (slightly)
simplify the original protocol.
We say a triple (a, b, c) is αi,j,k-consistent if there exists a degree-1 polynomial
w such that w(0) = a, w(1) = b and w(αi,j,k) = c. In the protocol description below,
we write α for αi,j,k.
ICsend(Pi, Pj , Pk, s, α) (Round Complexity : (1, 0))
1. Pi signs and sends s to Pj ; Pi picks random y, s
′, y′, computes z and z′ such
that (s, y, z) and (s′, y′, z′) are α-consistent; Pi sends s
′, y, y′ to Pj; Pi sends z
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and z′ to Pk. If Pj receives a valid signature of s, then Pj accepts s else Pj
rejects s.
ICauth(Pi, Pj, Pk, s, α) (Round Complexity : (5, 0))
1. If Pj accepts s in ICsend, then Pj picks a random d and 2-casts (d, s
′+ds, y′+dy)
to Pi and Pk else Pj 2-casts (Not taking part) and exits this phase.
2. If Pi detects that Pj has cheated in step 1, then Pi 2-casts (s, y) to Pj and
Pk; Pk adjusts the value of z such that (s, y, z) are α-consistent; else if (s
′ +
ds, y′ + dy, z′ + dz) is not α-consistent, then Pk sets trustk,i := 0.
3. If Pj detects that Pi has cheated in step 2, then Pj sends s (along with a
signature of Pi on s) and y to Pk; if that happens, then Pk adjusts the value
of z such that (s, y, z) is α-consistent.
ICreveal(Pj, Pk, s, α) (Round Complexity : (1, 0))
1. Pj sends (s, y) to Pk; if trustk,j = 0, then Pk will always reject; else if trustk,i =
0, then Pk will always accept; else Pk accepts or sets trustk,j := 0 depending
on whether (s, y, z) is α-consistent.
Proof of Correctness We now move on to prove that the above protocol is indeed
an information checking tool.
• Correctness:
– If Pi, Pj and Pk are all honest, then it is easy to see that Pj will accept s
in ICsend and Pk will accept s in ICval.
99
– If Pj and Pk are honest, and Pj accepts s in ICsend, then there are four
possible cases:
1. Pi does not 2-cast anything in step 2 of ICauth and (s
′ + ds, y′ +
dy, z′ + dz) is α-consistent.
2. Pi does not 2-cast anything in step 2 of ICauth and (s
′ + ds, y′ +
dy, z′ + dz) is not α-consistent.
3. Pi 2-cast (s̄, ȳ) in step 2 of ICauth and (s̄ 6= s or ȳ 6= y).
4. Pi 2-casts (s, y) in step 2 of ICauth phase.
Following the descriptions of the protocol, an honest Pk will always accept
what an honest Pj sent it in ICval for case (2) and case (4). For case (3),
an honest Pj will send (s, y) with a valid signature from Pi on s to Pk in
step 3. Pk will adjust the value of z accordingly. Hence Pk will accept
s in ICval. For case (1), Pk will not accept s if and only if (s, y, z) is
not α-consistent. We claim that if (s, y, z) is not α-consistent, then the
probability that (s′ + ds, y′ + dy, z′ + dz) is α-consistent is negligible over
random choice of d. Assume there exists two values a and b such that a 6=
b, both (s′+as, y′+ay, z′+az) and (s′+bs, y′+by, z′+bz) are α-consistent.
Then (s, y, z) is α-consistent too. Hence if (s, y, z) is not α-consistent,
there exists at most one value of d such that (s′ + ds, y′ + dy, z′ + dz) is
α-consistent. The claim then follows.
– If Pi and Pk are honest, then note that the view of Pj during ICsend and
ICauth is independent of α. If Pk accepts a value s
′ 6= s, then it means
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that a malicious Pj has guessed the value of α correctly. However, even if
multiple IC protocols can be executed between the triple (Pi, Pj, Pk) using
the same value α, a malicious Pj can only have one chance of guessing
the right value of α (Pk will set trustk,j := 0 if Pj makes a wrong guess).
Hence Pk will only accept s
′ 6= s with a negligible probability.
– It follows from the above proof that if Pk is honest, then for any honest
party Pa ∈ {Pi, Pj}, then Pk will set trustk,a := 0 only with negligible
probability.
• Secrecy: If Pi and Pj are honest, then in ICsend and ICreveal, the adversary (if
Pk is corrupted) learns z, z
′, d, s′ + ds, y′ + dy. However, since Pi and Pj are
both honest, (s′ + ds, y′ + dy, z′ + dz) is always α-consistent. Given s′ + ds,
z′+dz and α, the adversary can compute y′+dy by itself. It is easy to see that
the distribution of z, z′, d, s′ + ds is independent of s. Hence secrecy holds.
• Linearity: Suppose Pi, Pj, Pk have executed ICsend and ICauth for two different
values s1 and s2 using the same α. Now Pj wants to reveal βs1 +γs2 to Pk for
some known constants β and γ. In ICreveal, Pj can send (βs1 +γs2, βy1 +γy2)
to Pk; Pk accepts or rejects depending on trustk,i, trustk,j and whether (βs1 +
γs2, βy1 + γy2, βz1 + γz2) is αi,j,k-consistent.
4.3.2 IC-Signature
It will be handy to have the notion of IC-signature (a similar definition ap-
peared in [CDD+99, Section 4]) when we define and construct VSS protocols with
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2(3)-level sharing. Roughly speaking, an IC-signature scheme is similar to a (stan-
dard) signature scheme but it can have the linearity property. There are two parties
Pi and Pj , and Pi has a secret s. An IC-signature scheme has three phases:
• ICssend(Pi, Pj, s): Executes ICsend(Pi, Pj , Pk, s, αi,j,k) for all parties Pk. If Pj
receives the same s in all invocations, then Pj accepts s else Pj rejects.
• ICsauth(Pi, Pj, s): If Pj accepts s in ICssend, then executes ICsauth(Pi, Pj,Pk,s,
αi,j,k) for all parties Pk.
• ICsreveal(Pj , s): If Pj accepts s in ICssend, then executes ICreveal(Pj , Pk, s)
for all parties Pk.
The round complexities of ICssend, ICsauth and ICsreveal are (1, 0), (5, 0)
and (1, 0) respectively. If trustj,i = 1 after executions of ICssend(Pi, Pj, s) and IC-
sauth(Pi, Pj, s), then we say Pj obtains a IC-signature of s from Pi. If trustk,j = 1
after the execution of ICsreval(Pj, s), then we say Pk accepts the IC-signature of s
from Pj .
Following the properties of the information checking scheme given in the previ-
ous section, it is easy to see that the following conditions hold with all but negligible
probability:
• If Pj obtains a IC-signature of s from Pi, then an honest party Pk will accept
s from Pj in ICsreveal. Moreover, if Pi and Pj are both honest, then the view
of the adversary is independent of s before ICsreveal.
• If a (malicious) Pj does not obtain a IC-signature of s
′ from Pi, then no honest
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party Pk will accept s
′ in ICsreveal.
• If Pj obtains a IC-signature of s1 and s2 from Pi, then Pj can reveal the value
of βs1 + γs2 to all parties by executing ICsreveal(Pj , βs1 + γs2).
4.3.3 Generalized Secret Sharing with IC-signatures
Next, we provide an analogue of Section 4.2.1 for secret sharing using IC-
signatures. We start by extending the definitions of 2(3)-level sharing.
Definition 12 (2-level sharing with IC-authentication): We say that a value s has
been 2-level shared with IC-authentication if the following two conditions hold:
• There exists t+1 polynomials Fs(x), Fs1(x), . . . , Fsn(x), each of degree at most
t, such that Fs(0) = s, Fs1(0) = Fs(1), . . . , Fsn(0) = Fs(n).
• Each honest Pi knows the polynomial Fsi(x). In addition, for all j ∈ [n], either
Pj has obtained a IC-signature on Fsi(j) from (potentially corrupted) Pi or
the value of Fsi(j) has been made public.
♦
We call Fs(x) the polynomial that 1-level shares s.
Definition 13 (3-level sharing with IC-authentication): We say that a value s has
been 3-level shared with IC-authentication if the following conditions hold:
• s has been 2-level shared with IC-authentication.
• Let Fs(x) be the polynomial that 1-level shares s. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the value
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Fs(i) has been 2-level shared; Pi knows the polynomial Fsi(x) that 1-level
shares Fs(i).
♦
We now generalize the definition of VSS (cf. Definition 3) as follows:
Definition 14 (Generalized verifiable secret sharing): A two-phase protocol for par-
ties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a distinguished dealer P
∗ ∈ P holds an initial input s,
is a VSS protocol with 2-level (resp., 3-level) sharing and IC-authentication tolerat-
ing t malicious parties if the following conditions hold for any adversary controlling
at most t parties:
Validity By the end of the first phase, some value s′ is 2-level (resp., 3-level) shared
with IC-authentication. Moreover, if the dealer is honest then s′ = s.
Secrecy If the dealer is honest by the end of the first phase (the sharing phase),
then at the end of the first phase the joint view of the malicious parties is
independent of the dealer’s input s.
Reconstruction All honest parties output s′ at the end of the reconstruction phase.
♦
Remark If both s and s′ have been 2-level shared with IC-authentication, then
following the linearity of IC-signature, s + s′ has been 2-level shared with IC-
authentication as well.2
2It may be the case that for some pair (i, j), Pj has obtained a IC-signature on Fsi (j) from Pi
while the value of Fs′
i
(j) has been made public. However, following the linearity of IC-signature,
it means that Pj has obtained a IC-signature on Fsi(j) + Fs′i(j) from Pi.
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We now proceed to construct authenticated VSS protocol with 2(3)-level shar-
ing and IC-authentication. First, we make the following observation related to secret
reconstruction:
Lemma 4.3.2 Suppose s has been 2(3)-level shared with IC-authentication. As-
suming t < n/2, then the parties can reconstruct s using one round of interaction.
Proof Note that by definition, if s has been 3-level shared, then s has been 2-
level shared as well. If s has been 2-level shared, then s can be constructed by the
following routine:
Message Exchange For each i, if the value of Fsi(k) has not been made public,
then Pk executes ICsreveal(Pk, Fsi(k)).









Fsi(j) has been made public, or
















(j, F ′si(0)) :
A polynomial F ′si(x) of degree at most t












s(x) is the polynomial obtained
through interpolating the points in Sk.
First, we show that if a polynomial F ′si(x) of degree at most t can be inter-
polated from the set of points in Ski , then F
′
si
(x) is equal to Fsi(x). Consider an
honest party Pj . Either Fsi(j) has been made public or Pk will (only) accept the
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IC-signature of Fsi(j) from Pj (following the definition of IC-signature, see Sec-
tion 4.3.2). Hence F ′si(j) = Fsi(j). Since there are at least t+1 honest parties, both




Next, we show that if Pi is honest, then Pk can always interpolate the poly-
nomial Fsi(x) from the set S
k
i . If the value Fsi(j) has not been made public, then
following the definition of IC-signature, Pk will only accept a value from Pj if that
value is equal to Fsi(j). Moreover, if Pj is honest, then Pk will always accept the
IC-signature of Fsi(j). Since there are at least t + 1 honest parties, and Fsi(x) is
of degree at most t, it follows that Pk can always interpolate the polynomial Fsi(x)
from the set Ski .
Since Fs(x) is of degree at most t and there are at least t + 1 honest parties,
following from the previous paragraph, F ′s(x) = Fs(x) can always be reconstructed
from Sk. Hence the party Pk can reconstruct s = Fs(0).
Given the above lemma, we can now focus on constructing the sharing phase
of VSS protocol with 2(3)-level sharing and IC-authentication.
4.3.3.1 VSS Protocol with 2-Level Sharing
The following protocol is based on the sharing phase of the authenticated VSS
protocol for t < n/2 given in Lemma 2.2.5. We modify the protocol so that it is
with 2-level sharing and IC-authentication.
We consider a finite field F with s ∈ F, |F| > n, and [n] can be injectively
mapped to F. If the dealer is disqualified then execution of the protocol halts,
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and a default value s′ is 2-level shared. We say an ordered sequence of values
(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ F
n is t-consistent if there exists a polynomial f(x) of degree at most
t such that f(i) = vi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Step 1 The dealer chooses a random bivariate polynomial F (x, y) of degree at
most t in each variable with F (0, 0) = s. Let ai,j = bi,j
def
= F (i, j). The dealer
sends to party Pi the values a1,i, . . . , an,i and bi,1, . . . , bi,n, along with a digital
signature on each such value.
Step 2 If Pi receives all values (with valid signatures) from the dealer as specified in
round 1, {a1,i, a2,i, . . . , an,i} and {bi,1, bi,2, . . . , bi,n} are both t-consistent, then
Pi executes ICssend(Pi, Pj, aj,i) for all j, else Pi sends “No IC-signature” to all
Pj.
Step 3 The following two sub-routines are executed in parallel:
Sub-routine a If Pi does not send “No IC-signature” to Pj in step 2, then
executes ICsauth(Pi, Pj, aj,i).
Sub-routine b If Pi sends “No IC-signature” to all Pj in step 2, then Pi
broadcasts “Complaint: dealer”; else if Pi receives “No IC-signature”
from a party Pj, or Pi does not accept bi,j in ICssend(Pj , Pi, ai,j), then Pi
broadcasts bi,j and the signature of the dealer on bi,j (we say the value
bi,j has been made public).
Step 4 For any party Pj that broadcasts a complaint in step 3,
• The dealer broadcasts ~aj = (a1,j, . . . , an,j), ~bj = (bj,1, . . . , bj,n).
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• If Pi does not broadcast a complaint in step 3, then Pi broadcast aj,i and
bi,j with the dealer’s signature on these two values.
For any party Pj that broadcasts a value bj,i (with a valid signature from the
dealer on bj,i) in step 3,
• If Pi does not broadcast a complaint in step 3, then Pi broadcasts aj,i
and the signature of the dealer on aj,i.
The dealer is disqualified if one of the following conditions hold:
• If a party Pj broadcasts a complaint in step 3, but the dealer does not
respond to it in step 4, or either ~aj or ~bj broadcasted by the dealer is not
t-consistent or aj,j 6= bj,j.
• There exists a pair (i, j) such that each of ai,j and bi,j has been broadcast
by the dealer in step 4 or has been broadcast by a party along with the
dealer’s signature on the value, and ai,j 6= bi,j .
We now show that the above protocol implements the sharing phase of VSS
with 2-level sharing and IC-authentication.
We first prove secrecy. If the dealer is honest, no honest party will send “No
IC-signatures” to other parties in step 2. Furthermore, if Pi and Pj are both honest,
then Pj will accept bj,i = aj,i in ICssend(Pi, Pj, aj,i). Hence the value of aj,i will not
be broadcast in step 3 nor step 4. It follows that the information the adversary has
about s by the end of the sharing phase consists entirely of the values sent to the
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malicious parties by the dealer in round 1. Secrecy follows since F (x, y) is a random
bivariate polynomial of degree at most t.
Next we prove validity. The case for a disqualified malicious dealer is im-
mediate. On the other hand, it is easy to see that an honest dealer will never be
disqualified. To complete the proof, we are going to show that by the end of the
protocol, if the dealer is not disqualified, then there exists a bivariate polynomial
F ′(x, y) of degree at most t such that
• If the dealer is honest, then F ′(x, y) = F (x, y).
• Each Pi knows the polynomials F
′(x, i) and F ′(i, y). In addition, for each
Pj, either Pi has obtained a IC-signature on F
′(i, j) from Pj (even if Pj is
malicious) or the value of F ′(i, j) has been made public.
Takes F ′s(x) = F
′(0, x) and F ′si(x) = F
′(x, i), it follows that F ′(0, 0) has been 2-level
shared with IC-authentication.
It follows readily from the protocol that the above holds for an honest dealer.
We now consider a malicious dealer that is not disqualified. For each honest party
Pi, let ~ai = (a1,i, . . . , an,i), ~bi = (bi,1, . . . , bi,n) be the values held by Pi by the end
of the protocol. Either Pi obtains ~ai and ~bi from the dealer in step 1 or the dealer
broadcasts ~ai and ~bi in step 4. Since the dealer is not disqualified, ~ai and ~bi are both
t-consistent.
If Pi and Pj are both honest, then ai,j = bi,j. Assume this is not true. There
are four possible cases:
• Both Pi and Pj do not broadcast a complaint in step 3 (i.e., both parties do
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not send “No IC-signature” to other parties in step 2). Then it must be the
case that Pi does not accept bi,j in ICssend(Pj , Pi, ai,j) in step 2. Hence Pi will
make bi,j public in step 3. But then Pj will broadcast ai,j (with the signature
of the dealer on it) in step 4. The dealer will be disqualified since ai,j 6= bi,j.
• Pi broadcasts a complaint in step 3 but Pj does not. Then the dealer broad-
casts bi,j in step 4. Pj will broadcast ai,j in round 4 (with the signature of the
dealer on it). Hence the dealer will be disqualified.
• Pj broadcasts a complaint in step 3 but Pi does not. This case is symmetric
to the previous case.
• Both Pi and Pj broadcast a complaint in step 3: the dealer will be disqualified
since the dealer broadcasts ai,j and bi,j in step 4 but the two values are not
equal.
Since there are at least t+1 honest parties, and both ~ai and ~bi are t-consistent
if Pi is honest, there exists a bivariate polynomial F
′(x, y) of degree at most t such
that F ′(i, k) = bi,k and F
′(k, i) = ak,i for all honest parties Pi and all 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
To complete the proof for the second item, suppose a party Pi does not obtain
a IC-signature on F ′(i, j) = bi,j from Pj in step 2. In that case, either Pi will make
F ′(i, j) public in step 3 or Pi broadcasts a complaint in step 3 (and then the dealer
will make the value public by broadcasting it in step 4 ).
The round complexity of the above protocol is (8, 2): each step 1 and step 2
requires 1 round, sub-routine b of step 3 requires 1 round of broadcast, sub-routine
a of step 3 requires 5 rounds, and step 4 requires 1 round of broadcast.
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Reducing the number of rounds of broadcast: Using the method mentioned in the
proof of Lemma 2.2.5, we can reduce the round complexity of the above protocol to
(8, 1). In more details, the above protocol invokes two rounds of broadcast in the
following manner:
• In sub-routine b of step 3, if certain conditions hold, then Pi broadcasts a
message x.
• In step 4, if Pi broadcasts a message y in sub-routine b of step 3, then Pj
broadcasts a message z.
Call the above protocol Π. We construct a protocol Π′ with round complexity
(8, 1). Π′ is the same as Π except that:
1. In sub-routine b of step 3,
(a) If Pi is supposed to broadcast x in Π, then Pi signs and sends x to all
parties.
(b) If Pk receives x with a valid signature from Pi, then Pk forwards x (with
the signature of Pi on x) to all parties.
2. In step 4,
• If Pj receives at least 1 copy of y (with a valid signature of Pi on y) from
other parties in the previous step, then Pj broadcasts (Pi, y, z).
• In parallel to the above, if Pk receives x with a valid signature from Pi
in sub-routine b, then Pk broadcasts (Pi, x).
111
The party determines the output in Π′ the same way as they determine the
output in Π, except that they consider the set of broadcast values as follow:
• If at least t + 1 parties broadcast (Pi, x) in step 4 of Π
′, then Pi is considered
to broadcast x in step 3 of Π.
• If at least t + 1 parties broadcast (Pi, x) and Pj broadcasts (Pi, x, z) in step 4
of Π′, then Pj is considered to broadcast z in step 4 of Π.
In Π′, sub-routine b of step 3 now requires 2 rounds, but the overall round
complexity remains (8, 1) (Notice that sub-routine a of step 3 requires 5 rounds).
Using the same argument as in Lemma 2.2.5, we can show that Π′ implements
the sharing phase of VSS with 2-level sharing and IC-authentication. Thus we have
the following:
Lemma 4.3.3 There exists an authenticated VSS protocol with 2-level sharing and
IC-authentication tolerating t < n/2 malicious parties such that the round complexity
of its sharing phase is (8, 1) and the round complexity of its reconstruction phase is
(1, 0).
4.3.3.2 VSS Protocol with 3-Level Sharing
In this section, we construct a protocol to implement the sharing phase of
VSS with 3-level sharing and IC-authentication. Basically, the dealer will run n + 1
invocations of the protocol from the previous section in parallel with the following
modifications:
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1. In the first step,
• In the first invocation, the dealer picks a random bivariate polynomial
F0(x, y) such that F0(0, 0) = s.
• In the kth (1 ≤ k ≤ n) invocation, the dealer picks random bivariate
polynomials Fk(x, y) with the restriction that Fk(0, y) = F0(k, y).
2. In the second step, to ensure that Fk(0, y) = F0(k, y) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, each
party Pi will do this additional checking:
• Let {ak1,i, a
k
2,i, . . . , a
k
n,i} be the shares Pi obtained in the k
th invocation.






2,i, . . . , a
k
n,i} and check
if F ik(0) = a
0
k,i.
• If there exists a k such that F ik(0) 6= a
0
k,i, then Pi will always send “No
IC-signature” to all parties in all k + 1 invocations (instead of executing
ICsauth).
3. In the forth step, if the dealer is required to broadcast the shares of a party
Pi in a particular invocation, then the dealer broadcasts the shares of Pi in all
invocations. At the end of the protocol, the dealer will be disqualified if there
exists a k such that Fk(0, i) 6= a
0
k,i (in addition to the existing conditions).
We now give the description of the protocol.
Step 1 The dealer chooses a random bivariate polynomial F0(x, y) of degree at
most t in each variable with F0(0, 0) = s. In addition, the dealer chooses n
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random bivariate polynomials F1(x, y), . . . , Fn(x, y) of degree at most t in both







The dealer sends to party Pi the values a
k




i,1, . . . , b
k
i,n, along
with a digital signature on each such value.
Step 2 If Pi receives all values (with valid signatures) from the dealer as specified
in round 1, for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n, {ak1,i, a
k
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i,n} are t-
consistent, and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, there exists a polynomial F ik(x) of degree at
most t such that F ik(z) = a
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j,i) for all j and k, else Pi sends “No IC-signature” to all Pj.
Step 3 The following two sub-routines are executed in parallel:
Sub-routine a If Pi does not send “No IC-signature” to Pj in step 2, then
executes ICsauth(Pi, Pj, a
k
j,i) for all k.
Sub-routine b If Pi sends “No IC-signature” to all parties in step 2, then
Pi broadcasts “Complaint: dealer”; else if Pi receives “No IC-signature”
from Pj or Pi does not output (accept, b
k
i,j) in ICssend(Pj , Pi, a
k
i,j) for any
k, then Pi broadcasts b
k
i,j and the signature of the dealer on b
k
i,j for all k.
Step 4 For any party Pj that broadcasts a complaint in step 3, then for all 0 ≤
k ≤ n,
• The dealer broadcasts ~akj = (a
k





j,1, . . . , b
k
j,n).
• If Pi does not broadcast a complaint in step 3, then Pi broadcast a
k
j,i and
bki,j with the dealer’s signature on these two values.
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For any party Pj that broadcasts a value b
k
j,i (with a valid signature from the
dealer on bkj,i) in step 3,
• If Pi does not broadcast a complaint in step 3, then Pi broadcasts a
k
j,i
and the signature of the dealer on akj,i.
The dealer is disqualified and a default value is 3-level shared if one of the
following conditions hold:
• If a party Pj broadcasts a complaint in step 3, but the dealer does not
respond to it in step 4, or for some k either ~akj or
~bkj broadcast by the
dealer is not t-consistent, or akj,j 6= b
k
j,j or there does not exist a polynomial
Fk(x) of degree at most t such that Fk(0) = a
0




• There exists a triple (i, j, k) such that each of aki,j and b
k
i,j has been broad-
casted by the dealer in step 4 or has been broadcasted by a party along
with the dealer’s signature on the value, and aki,j 6= b
k
i,j.
We now argue that the above protocol implement the sharing phase of VSS
with 3-levels sharing.
We first argue secrecy. It follows from the proof in the last section that if Pk is
honest, then the adversary does not learn any additional information on Fk(0, 0) =
F0(0, k). Thus the view of the adversary remains independent of s = F0(0, 0).
Next we argue validity. The case for an honest dealer or a disqualified malicious
dealer is obvious. We consider a malicious dealer who is not disqualified. Following
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the proof in the last section, Fk(0, 0) has been 2-level shared for 0 ≤ k ≤ n. To
complete the proof, it suffices to argue that Fk(0, y) = F0(k, y) for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Since
the dealer is not disqualified, then Fk(0, i) = a
0
k,i = F0(k, i) for all honest parties Pi.
As Fk(0, y) is a polynomial of degree at most t, Fk(0, y) = F0(k, y).
The above protocol has round complexity (8, 2). Using exactly the same tech-
nique as described in the last section, we can reduce the round complexity to (8, 1).
Thus, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4.3.4 There exists an authenticated VSS protocol with 3-level sharing and
IC-authentication tolerating t < n/2 malicious parties such that the round complexity
of its sharing phase is (8, 1) and the round complexity of its reconstruction phase is
(1, 0).
4.3.4 Generating Random Multiplication Triples
We describe the protocol for generating one random multiplication triple, as in
Section 4.2.2, the protocol can be parallelized to generate as many triples as needed.
The protocol given below is based on the multiplication protocol in [CDD+99].
However, for the protocol given in [CDD+99], each time when a (corrupted) party
is disqualified in sharing product of its shares, the protocol is rewinded to reveal the
shares of the disqualified party. As a result, the round complexity of the protocol
may not be a constant since there can be a linear number of rewinding. We use VSS
with 3-level sharing as a building block in our construction so that rewinding is not
needed to reveal the shares of the disqualified parties (since these shares would have
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already been 2-level shared). Hence the round complexity of the overall protocol
can remain to be a constant.3
Step 1 Each party Pi picks two random values ai and bi and shares them using the




aj and B =
∑
bj ; let A(x) and B(x) be the polynomials that 1-level
share A and B respectively; and let Ai
def
= A(i) and Bi
def
= B(i). For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
the following steps are carried out in parallel :
Step 2 The following three routines are carried out in parallel:
(a) Let Ai(x) and Bi(x) be the polynomials that 1-level share Ai and Bi
respectively. Pi shares AiBi using the sharing phase of the VSS protocol
with 2-level sharing and IC-authentication in Section 4.3.3.1. Let Ci(x)
be the polynomial that 1-level shares AiBi.
(b) Pi picks a random βi. Pi shares βi and βiBi using the sharing phase
of the VSS protocol with 2-level sharing and IC-authentication in Sec-
tion 4.3.3.1.. Let fβi(x) and fβiBi(x) be the polynomials that 1-level share
βi and βiBi respectively.
(c) Each Pj picks a random r
j
i and shares it using the sharing phase of a VSS
protocol.
3In [DI05], a primitive called EVSS is used to handle this problem. EVSS is similar to VSS
with 3-level of sharing. However, we are able to construct more round-efficient protocol due to the
usage of PKI.
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Step 3 The parties reconstruct {rji } and computes ri =
∑
rji .
Step 4 Pi broadcasts the following two polynomials:
• f 1i (x) = riAi(x) + fβi(x)
• f 2i (x) = f
1
i (0)Bi(x) −fβiBi(x) − riCi(x).
Step 5 If f 1i (k) 6= riAi(k) + fβi(k) or f
2
i (k) 6= f
1
i (0)Bi(k)− fβiBi(k)− riCi(k), then
Pk broadcasts a complaint, as well as the signatures of Pi on fβi(k), fβiBi(k)
and Ci(k) (if such values have not been made public)
4.
Step 6 Let Faj (x) and Fbj (x) be the polynomials that 1-level share aj and bj re-
spectively; let Faij (x) and Fbij (x) be the polynomials that 1-level share Faj (i)
and Fbj (i) respectively (recall that aj and bj have been 3-level shared). If Pk
broadcasts a complaint, then for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, Pi broadcasts Faij (k), Fbij (k)
and the signatures of Pk on each of the values (assuming the corresponding
value has not been made public)5.
Step 7 Pi is disqualified if one of the following conditions hold:
• Pk broadcasts a complaint in step 6 but Pi does not respond to it, or Pi





j Faij (k) + fβi(k), or f
2




j Fbij (k) − fβiBi(k) − riCi(k).
• f 2i (0) 6= 0.
4Pk has these signatures if the VSS protocol given in Section 4.3.3.1 is used.
5Pk has these signatures since the VSS protocol given in Section 4.3.3.2 is used.
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If Pi is disqualified, then the parties reconstruct the values of Ai and Bi (note
that Ai and Bi have already been 2-level shared). Otherwise, it will follow
from our proof that Ci(0) = AiBi has been 2-level shared.
Output Determination Following Lemma 4.2.3, the parties can then compute
the shares of C non-interactively.
We now prove the correctness of the protocol by showing the following three
lemmas:




bi are randomly distributed.
Proof The above follows directly from the secrecy property of VSS.
Lemma 4.3.6 If Pi is honest, then the view of the adversary remains independent
of AiBi by the end of the protocol.
Proof The polynomial f 1i (x) reveals no information on AiBi as the view of the
adversary is independent of βi. Furthermore, if Pi is honest, then an adversary
corrupting t parties can reconstruct the polynomial f 2i (x) given its view in the first
three steps: f 2i (x) is a polynomial of degree at most t, f
2
i (0) = riAiBi+βiBi−βiBi−
riCi = 0, and the adversary knows f
2
i (k) = f
1
i (0)Bi(k)− fβiBi(k)− riCi(k) for every
malicious party Pk. Hence broadcasting the polynomial f
2
i (x) in step 4 does not
give the adversary any new information. An honest party Pk will not broadcast a
complaint against Pi in step 5. Thus, the adversary does not learn any additional
information in steps 5 and 6. The lemma then follows as Pi will not be disqualified
in step 7.
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Following the above lemma, the view of the adversary remains independent of
A and B after the protocol.
Lemma 4.3.7 If Pi is not disqualified, Ci(0) = AiBi with all but negligible proba-
bility.
Proof If Pi is not disqualified, then f
1
i (x) = riAi(x) + fβi(x) and f
2
i (x) =




i (x) are polynomials of degree at
most t and f 1i (k) = riAi(k) + fβi(k), f
2
i (k) = f
1
i (0)Bi(k) − fβiBi(k) − riCi(k) for
all honest parties Pk. Furthermore, f
2
i (0) = 0. Hence (riAi(0) + fβi(0))Bi(0) =
fβiBi(0) + riCi(0). Therefore ri(Ai(0)Bi(0) − Ci(0)) = fβiBi(0) − fβi(0)Bi(0). Note
that ri is revealed to the adversary only after the values of fβiBi(0) and fβi(0) are
fixed. Since ri is randomly generated, the equality will hold only with negligible
probability if Ai(0)Bi(0) 6= Ci(0).
The round complexity of the above protocol is (21, 5): the round complexities
of both step 1 and step 2 are (8, 1); step 3 requires 1 round of interaction; each of
steps 4 to 6 require 1 round of broadcast; step 7 requires 1 round of interaction.
Reducing the round complexity: There are a number of modifications we can
do to reduce the round complexity.
Modification 1. As in Section 4.2.2, we can apply the technique from [FGG+06] to
reduce the round complexities of step 1 and step 2 from (16, 2) to (9, 2): suppose Pi
is required to share a value x in step 2 of the original protocol. Instead, Pi shares a
random value r in step 1 and broadcasts x − r in step 2.
Modification 2. We can save one round of broadcast by modifying steps 4 to 7 of
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the protocol as follows. The main idea is that we postpone the usage of broadcast
in step 4 to step 6 by using a (regular) signature scheme.
Step 4 Pi sends f
1
i (x) = riAi(x)+fβi(x) and f
2
i (x) = f
1
i (0)Bi(x)−fβiBi(x)−riCi(x)
to all parties, along with a signature on each polynomial.
Step 5 Pk broadcasts a complaint, as well as the signatures of Pi on fβi(k), fβiBi(k)
and Ci(k) (if these values have not been made public), if one of the following
conditions hold:
• Pk does not receive the polynomials f
1
i (x) or f
2
i (x) (with valid signatures).
• f 1i (k) 6= riAi(k) + fβi(k) or f
2
i (k) 6= f
1
i (0)Bi(k) − fβiBi(k) − riCi(k).
Step 6 • Pk broadcasts the polynomials (along with signatures from Pi) it re-
ceived in step 4.
• If Pk broadcasts a complaint, then for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, Pi broadcasts
Faij (k), Fbij (k) and the signatures of Pk on each of the values (assuming
the corresponding value has not been made public).
Step 7 Pi is disqualified if one of the following conditions hold:
• Two different polynomials (with valid signatures from Pi) for f
1
i (x) or
f 2i (x) were broadcast in step 6.
• Pk broadcasts a complaint in step 6 but Pi does not respond to it or Pi





j Faij (k) + fβi(k) or f
2




j Fbij (k) − fβiBi(k) − riCi(k) or
f 2i (0) 6= 0.
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If Pi is disqualified, then the parties reconstruct the values of Ai and Bi (note
that Ai and Bi have been 2-level shared).
Modification 3. After modification 2, two rounds of broadcasts are invoked in steps
5 and 6 in the following manner:
• In step 5, if certain conditions hold, then Pk broadcasts a message x.
• In step 6, if Pk broadcasts a message y in step 5, then Pi broadcasts a mes-
sage z.
To reduce the number of rounds of broadcasts from two to one, we can apply
the same technique that was used in Lemma 2.2.5 and Section 4.3.3.1, at the expense
of an additional round of interaction. We modify steps 5–7 as follows:
Step 5
Sub-step a If one of the following conditions hold: (i) Pk does not receive
the polynomials f 1i (x) or f
2
i (x) (with valid signatures). (ii) f
1
i (k) 6=
riAi(k) + fβi(k) or f
2
i (k) 6= f
1
i (0)Bi(k) − fβiBi(k) − riCi(k), then Pk
sends and signs the following to all parties: “Pk complains Pi”, and the
signatures of Pi on fβi(k), fβiBi(k) and Ci(k) (if the values have not been
made public).
Sub-step b A party forwards all the messages it received in step a to Pi.
Step 6 • Pk broadcasts the polynomials (along with signatures from Pi) it re-
ceived in step 4, as well as all the messages it received in step 5a.
122
• If Pi receives a message “Pk complains Pi” (with valid signature from Pk)
in step 5b, then for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, Pi broadcasts Faij (k), Fbij (k) and the
signatures of Pk on each of the values (assuming the corresponding value
has not been made public).
Step 7 Pi is disqualified if one of the following conditions hold:
• Two different polynomials (with valid signatures from Pi) for f
1
i (x) or
f 2i (x) were broadcast in step 6.
• In step 6, at least t + 1 parties broadcast “Pk complains Pi”, as well as
the signatures of Pi on fβi(k), fβiBi(k) and Ci(k) (if the values have not
been made public),
and
Pi does not respond to the complaint in step 6, or Pi fails to provide the
signatures of Pk on the required values, or f
1
i (k) 6= ri
∑
j Faij (k) + fβi(k),




j Fbij (k) − fβiBi(k) − riCi(k), or f
2
i (0) 6= 0.
If Pi is disqualified, then the parties reconstruct the values of Ai and Bi (note
that Ai and Bi have been 2-level shared).
After the above three modifications, step 1 and step 2 now require 9 rounds
(including 2 rounds of broadcast) in total; steps 3 and 4 require 1 round each, step 5
requires 2 rounds, step 6 requires 1 round of broadcast and step 7 requires 1 round
of interaction. Thus, we have the following:
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Lemma 4.3.8 There exists an authenticated protocol with round complexity (15, 3)
tolerating t < n/2 malicious parties that generates random multiplication triples.
4.3.5 Constant-Round MPC Protocols using One Round of
Broadcast
By applying the same transformation as described in Section 4.2.3.1 to the ran-
dom multiplication triples generation protocol, and using the authenticated grade-
cast protocol in Lemma 2.2.2 , we have a protocol implementing the setup phase
with round complexity (29, 1). Given this result, following the discussion in Sec-
tion 4.2.3.2, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 4.3.9 Assuming the existence of one-way functions and public-key in-
frastructure, there exists a secure multiparty computation protocol tolerating t < n/2
malicious parties with round complexity (34, 1).
Following Corollary 3.2.4, this immediately gives a MPC protocol with (ex-
pected) round complexity (67, 0). However, we can do better. The protocol in
Theorem 4.3.9 does not use broadcast until the 28th round. In Section 3.2.2, we
have made the observation that some components of our broadcast protocol (in
particular, the first phase of an OLE protocol) can be carried out in advance even
before the broadcast values are known. This observation allows us to save 5 rounds
of interaction. Thus, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 4.3.10 Assuming the existence of one-way functions and public-key in-
frastructure, there exists a secure multiparty computation protocol tolerating t < n/2
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malicious parties with expected round complexity 62.
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Part II
Feasibility of Broadcast in Radio Networks
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Chapter 5
Feasibility of Broadcast in Radio Networks
In this chapter, we study the feasibility of broadcast in radio networks in the
presence of malicious parties. We describe our network and adversarial model and
give the necessary definitions in Section 5.1. We give a protocol in Section 5.2
that can achieve broadcast if the adversary cannot corrupt more than a certain
number of parties in any neighborhood. We show the bound is tight in Section 5.3
in the sense that broadcast is impossible if the number of corrupted parties in some
neighborhood is greater than that number.
5.1 Preliminaries
We recall the requirements of the broadcast problem. There is a distinguished
party Pd known as the dealer that holds an initial message M. A protocol is said
to achieve broadcast if the following conditions hold:
1. All (honest) parties eventually output a common value v.
2. If the dealer is honest, then v = M.
We consider the network model where parties are located on an infinite grid
(each grid unit is a 1 × 1 square). A party can be uniquely identified by its grid
location (x, y).
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Assuming absence of collisions, if a party multicasts a message m, then all
parties within distance r (in an appropriate metric) will receive the message. This
distance r is known as the transmission radius. The set of parties within this radius is
termed as the neighborhood of (x, y) and is denoted as nbd(x, y). Parties in nbd(x, y)
are known as the neighbors of (x, y). (x, y) is considered to be in nbd(x, y). For
convenience, we denote by nbd2(x, y) the set of parties that are at most two hops
away from (x, y), i.e.,
nbd2(x, y)
def
= {(x2, y2) : ∃(x1, y1) s.t. (x2, y2) ∈ nbd(x1, y1) ∧ (x1, y1) ∈ nbd(x, y)} .
We let r̃
def
= ⌊r⌋, that is r̃ is the truncation of r in case r is not an integer.
Message Collision: When two parties Pi and Pj multicast at the same time, a
message collision occurs at the parties in nbd(Pi)∩ nbd(Pj). If parties are equipped
with collision detectors, then parties in nbd(Pi) ∩ nbd(Pj) detect that a message
collision has occurred and can substitute default messages instead. In the absence
of a collision detector, there is no guarantee on what parties in nbd(Pi) ∩ nbd(Pj)
receive.
We primarily present results in the L∞ metric, where the distance between
points (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) is given by max {|x1 − x2|, |y1 − y2|}. Note that there is
a total number of (2r̃ + 1)2 parties in a neighborhood. However, our protocols are
also applicable in the L2 (also known as the “Euclidean”) metric, where the distance
between points as before is given by
√
(x1 − x2)2 + (y1 − y2)2. This issue will be
briefly discussed in the corresponding section.
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We consider a locally bounded adversarial model, i.e., the adversary is allowed
to corrupt parties as long as no single neighborhood contains more than t corrupted
parties. We assume there exists a pre-determined time division multiple access
(TDMA) schedule such that if all parties follow the schedule, then no collision will
occur. However, a corrupted party is allowed to deviate from the schedule and cause
message collision and spoof the identity of another party for a bounded number of
times (of course, we assume an honest party always follows the schedule). Let
nc and ns be the corresponding bounds on the number of message collisions and
address spoofing respectively that a corrupted party can perform. Both nc and ns
are assumed to be known in advance by all parties.
Identity Spoofing: A corrupted party Pi is able to spoof an honest party Pj
when it is the turn of Pj to multicast a message (according to the underlying TDMA
schedule) but Pj has no message to send (according to the prescribed protocol). In
this scenario, Pi can impersonate Pj by multicasting a message m with the sender
identity falsely set to Pj . If this happens, then the parties in nbd(Pi) ∩ nbd(Pj)
receive m and treat m as originating from Pj.
We remark that the problem of identity spoofing can be reduced to message
collision by having Pj always multicasts something (e.g., a fixed dummy message)
when it is its turn instead of remaining silent. However, this approach is communi-
cation inefficient, and our solution takes a different approach.
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5.2 Feasibility Result
In this section, we present a protocol that can achieve broadcast for t <
1
2
r̃(2r̃+1) in the L∞ metric, even if a corrupted party can cause nc message collisions
and ns spoofed address. Our solutions use some known results in the literature; we
we review them in Section 5.2.1. We describe our protocol in Section 5.2.2.
In the descriptions of protocols that follow, when we say a party multicasts
a message m, we actually mean the party multicasts m in its next available turn
(according to the TDMA schedule).
5.2.1 Tools
Our solutions use some known results in the literature, reviewed below.
Broadcast in Point-to-Point Networks We only review the essentials for our
solution. Please refer to Section 1.1.1 for a more detailed review. Consider a fully
connected point-to-point network where there is an authenticated channel connect-
ing each pair of parties. An adversary cannot modify the messages sent between
honest parties, but it can observe the messages. An execution of a synchronous
protocol takes place in a sequence of rounds. In each round, parties send messages
to each other depending on the messages they have received in the previous rounds.
An adversary is said to be rushing if it can see the messages sent to corrupted parties
in the current round before it decides the outgoing messages of faulty parties for
that round. Let n be the total number of parties. The following result is well-known
(see, e.g. [PSL80, GM98]):
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Lemma 5.2.1 There exists a synchronous protocol Bp2p that achieves broadcast in
a fully connected point-to-point network in the presence of a rushing adversary cor-
rupting t < 1
3
n parties. Bp2p terminates in a fixed number of rounds and has the
following property: within the same round, an honest party always sends the same
message to all other parties.
Broadcast in Radio Networks without Collisions or Identity Spoofing
We review the broadcast algorithm Bno collision described in [BV05b] that achieves
broadcast if t < 1
2
r̃(2r̃ + 1), assuming the L∞ metric, no collisions, and no address
spoofing.
1. (Broadcast in nbd(Pd)): The dealer Pd multicasts the message M. Each
neighbor Pi of Pd outputs the first value it receives from Pd and then multicasts
a COMMITTED(Pi,M) message.
2. (Broadcast in the rest of the network): Every party Pj (including the
dealer and the neighbors of the dealer) follows the procedure below:
• On receipt of a COMMITTED(Pi, v) message from neighbor Pi, record
the message and multicast a HEARD(Pj , Pi, v) message.
• On receipt of a HEARD(Pi, Pk, v) message from neighbor Pi, record the
message (but do not propagate it further).
• (Output determination): All Pj that are not neighbors of Pd continually
check the following: if there exists a party Pq, a value v, and Pj has
recorded t + 1 messages m1, m2, . . . , mt+1 such that (i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ t + 1,
131
message mi is of the form COMMITTED(Pai , v) or HEARD(Pai , Pa′i , v);
and (ii) Pa1 , . . . , Pa′1, . . . are all distinct neighbors of Pq, then Pj outputs
the value v.
The following is implicit in the proof of [BV05b, Theorem 2]:
Claim 5.2.2 Assuming the L∞ metric, no collisions, no address spoofing, and t <
1
2
r̃(2r̃ + 1), Bno collision achieves broadcast. In addition, there exists a constant T
(dependent on t, r̃) such that if the parties start executing Bno collision at time 0, all
honest parties in nbd2(Pd) output M by time T .
Moreover, the above holds even the adversary is given the following extra power:
when a corrupted party Pi 6= Pd performs a multicast, the neighbors of Pi can receive
different messages, subject to the choice of the adversary.
5.2.2 Our Broadcast Protocol
Following Claim 5.2.2, broadcast can be achieved in the presence of an adver-
sary that can cause message collisions and spoofed address if we obtain a protocol
based on Bno collision such that:
1. (Broadcast in nbd(Pd)): In step 1, neighbors of the dealer agree on a common
message (as the message originated from the dealer) before they propagate it
to other parties in the network.
2. (Broadcast in the rest of the network): In step 2, whenever an honest
party multicasts a message m, its neighbors are able to receive m correctly
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despite the possible occurrence of collisions caused by corrupted parties in the
vicinity. If the adversary can send spoofed address, then a party will accept
a message m from a neighbor only if it is convinced that m originated from
that neighbor.
Condition (1), above, is required to handle situations where a corrupted dealer
can collude with other corrupted parties, and use collisions to send conflicting values
to different neighbors. An example is as follows: a corrupted dealer multicasts two
inconsistent messages; a corrupted party on its left causes a message collision the
first time; a corrupted party on its right causes a message collision the second time.
Now parties on the left will get a message different from those parties on the right.
To this effect, we develop an agreement protocol among parties in nbd(Pd). We use
a primitive called weak broadcast as a building block in this agreement protocol.
Weak broadcast is defined as follows:
Definition 15 (Weak Broadcast) A party Pi performs a weak broadcast of a
message m to a set of parties S within time T if the following conditions hold:
1. An honest party Pj ∈ S outputs a message mj within time T .
2. If Pi is honest, then mj = m for all honest parties Pj ∈ S.
Note that if Pi is corrupted, then two honest parties may output two different
messages.
In Section 5.2.2.2, we show how to construct protocols for weak broadcast and,
subsequently, broadcast. But first, in Section 5.2.2.1, we will show how to achieve
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agreement among the neighbors of the dealer, assuming each party in nbd(Pd) is
capable of performing a weak broadcast to all other parties in nbd(Pd) within time T .
5.2.2.1 Agreement among Neighbors of the Dealer
We transform the broadcast protocol Bp2p (cf. Lemma 5.2.1) for n = |nbd(Pd)|
parties and working in the point-to-point model to a broadcast protocol Bnbd(Pd) for
the set nbd(Pd) and working in the radio network model.
Bnbd(Pd) simulates Bp2p round by round. Suppose in a given round of Bp2p,
party Pi is instructed to send the message mi to other parties. To simulate one
round of execution in Bp2p, the parties run the following subroutine sequentially:
for each party Pi ∈ nbd(Pd), party Pi does a weak broadcast of the
message mi to all parties in nbd(Pd).
Note that the weak broadcast may be viewed as establishing a virtual point-
to-point link between pairs of parties in nbd(Pd). Thus, it is ensured that if Pi is
honest, all other parties receive the same value from Pi. If Pi is corrupted, receipt
of conflicting values is acceptable, as Pi is capable of sending different values to
different parties in the point-to-point model (cf. Claim 5.2.2).
Finally, party Pi outputs whatever it is directed to output by Bp2p. We note
that if the round complexity of Bp2p is R, then Bnbd(Pd) takes time RT |nbd(Pd)|.
Lemma 5.2.3 If t < 1
2
r̃(2r̃ + 1), then Bnbd(Pd) ensures that all neighbors of the
dealer output the same message m′. If the dealer is honest, then m′ = M.
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Proof n = |nbd(Pd)| = (2r̃ + 1)(2r̃ + 1). If t <
1
2
r̃(2r̃ + 1), then t < 1
4
|nbd(Pd)|.
The lemma then follows from the fact that Bp2p can tolerate a rushing adversary
corrupting fewer than 1
3
n parties.
5.2.2.2 Weak Broadcast and Broadcast
Depending on different assumptions (i.e., whether corrupted parties are al-
lowed to spoof the identity of other parties, whether honest parties are equipped
with collision detectors, etc.), we show how to obtain a weak broadcast protocol and
then a protocol for broadcast in the entire network. The most general case is that
corrupted parties are allowed to do address spoofing and parties are not equipped
with collision detectors. However, we provide constructions for other cases to serve
as a warmup.
(i) No Address Spoofing; Collision Detectors
Here we assume ns = 0. An honest party may fail to receive a message from
another honest party due to message collision; however, this can happen at most
tnc number of times. We observe that if an honest party Pi multicasts a message m
for a total of tnc + 1 times, then any neighbor of Pi will receive at least one copy of
m successfully.
Based on the protocol Bno collision, we construct a protocol Brepeat where a party
Pi will execute the same instructions as in Bno collision except that:
• If Pi is instructed to multicast a message m in Bno collision, then Pi multicasts
the message m for a total of tnc + 1 times.
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• If Pi is instructed to carry out an action after receipt of a message m from Pj
in Bno collision, then Pi carries out the corresponding action only when it receives
m from Pj for the first time.
Brepeat will be used as a building block for our weak broadcast protocol. For
the sake of completeness, we include the protocol description for Brepeat:
1. The dealer Pd′ multicasts the message M for a total of tnc + 1 times. Each
neighbor Pi of Pd′ outputs the first value v it heard from Pd′ .
2. If Pi is a neighbor of Pd′ and it outputs a value v, then it multicasts the
message COMMITTED(Pi, v) for a total of tnc + 1 times.
3. Every party Pj (including the dealer and the neighbors of the dealer) follows
the procedure below:
• On receipt of a COMMITTED(Pi, v) message from a neighbor Pi for the
first time, record the message and multicast HEARD(Pj , Pi, v) for a total
of tnc + 1 times.
• On receipt of a HEARD(Pi, Pk, v) message from a neighbor Pi for the
first time, record the message (but do not re-propagate).
• Output the value v and multicast COMMITTED(Pj , v) tnc + 1 times if:
not already committed to a value, and there exists a party Pq and t + 1
recorded messages m1, m2, . . . , mt+1 such that (1) for all i, either mi =
COMMITTED(Pai , v) or mi=HEARD(Pai, Pai′ , v), and (2) {Pai, Pai′} are
all distinct neighbors of Pq.
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The dealer Pd′ mentioned above is the dealer in the protocol Brepeat (used as a
building block), and is not to be confused with the dealer of the overall broadcast. As
can be seen, Brepeat primarily differs from Bno collision in that messages are repeated
sufficiently-many times so that they will eventually be received even if there are
collisions. We have:
Lemma 5.2.4 Assume the L∞ metric, and t <
1
2
r̃(2r̃ + 1). Then there exists a
constant T (depending on r) such that the following holds: If the dealer Pd′ in
Brepeat is honest and all parties execute Brepeat for time T , then all honest parties in
nbd2(Pd′) will output m.
Proof This follows from Claim 5.2.2.
Achieving Weak Broadcast Note that in Brepeat, if the party Pd′ is corrupted
then an honest party may not output a value. However, it is easy to modify Brepeat
to obtain a weak broadcast protocol.
Lemma 5.2.5 Assume the L∞ metric, and t <
1
2
r̃(2r̃ + 1). Then for any party Pd′
there exists a protocol Bweak broadcast that allows a party Pi ∈ nbd(Pd′) (which can be
potentially corrupted) to perform a weak broadcast to nbd(Pd′) within time T .
Proof In Bweak broadcast (with Pi as dealer of the weak broadcast), parties execute
Brepeat for a period of time T . After time T , if a party has not yet been able to output




The lemma then follows from Lemma 5.2.4.
Achieving Broadcast Following Lemma 5.2.5, every party in nbd(Pd) can perform
a weak broadcast to nbd(Pd). Thus, we have the primitive required to run protocol
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Bnbd(Pd). We can now obtain a broadcast protocol resilient to a bounded number of
collisions. This protocol Breliable broadcast is a modified version of Brepeat, where the
first step of Brepeat is changed to the following:
The parties execute the protocol Bnbd(Pd) with the dealer Pd using the
message M as the input. Let mi be the output of party Pi in Bnbd(Pd).
Each neighbor Pi of Pd outputs mi.
With this change, we obtain a protocol achieving broadcast.
The above protocol can also be used in the absence of a collision detector, and
in the presence of address spoofing, after minor modifications. We discuss various
scenarios below.
(ii) No Address Spoofing; No Collision Detectors
The construction is similar to case (i) except that in the transformation of
Bno collision into Brepeat:
• If a party Pi is instructed to multicast a message m in Bno collision, then in Brepeat
Pi multicasts the message m for a total of 2tnc + 1 times.
• If a party Pi is instructed to carry out an action after receipt of a message
m from Pj in Bno collision, then in Brepeat party Pi carries out the corresponding
action only when it receives tnc + 1 copies of m from Pj.
Note that if an honest party Pi multicasts a message m for a total of 2tnc + 1
times, then a neighbor of Pi will receive at least tnc +1 legitimate copies of m. Now,
if a party Pj receives tnc + 1 copies of m from Pi, then Pj can conclude that m has
not been corrupted due to message collisions.
138
(iii) Address Spoofing; Collision Detectors
In the transformation of Bno collision into Brepeat, we now do the following:
• If a party Pi is instructed to multicast a message m in Bno collision, then in Brepeat
party Pi multicasts the message m for a total of t(nc + ns) + 1 times.
• If a party Pi is instructed to carry out an action after receipt of a message
m from Pj in Bno collision, then in Brepeat party Pi carries out the corresponding
action only when it receives tns + 1 copies of m from Pj.
If an honest party Pi multicasts a message m for a total of t(nc +ns)+1 times,
then a neighbor of Pi will receive at least tns + 1 legitimate copies of m. On the
other hand, if a party Pj receives tns + 1 copies of m claimed to be originated from
Pi, then Pj can conclude that m indeed originated from Pi.
(iv) Address Spoofing; No Collision Detectors
In the transformation of Bno collision into Brepeat, we now do the following:
• If a party Pi is instructed to multicast a message m in Bno collision, then in Brepeat
party Pi multicasts the message m for a total of t(2nc + ns) + 1 times.
• If a party Pi is instructed to carry out an action after receipt of a message
m from Pj in Bno collision, then in Brepeat party Pi carries out the corresponding
action only when it receives t(nc + ns) + 1 copies of m from Pj.
If an honest party Pi multicasts a message m for a total of t(2nc + ns) + 1
times, then a neighbor of Pi will receive at least t(nc + ns) + 1 legitimate copies of
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m. On the other hand, if a party Pj receives t(nc + ns) + 1 copies of m claimed to
be originated from Pi, then Pj can conclude that m indeed originated from Pi.
Thus, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 5.2.6 In the L∞ metric, if t <
1
2
r̃(2r̃+1) then there exists a protocol that
achieves broadcast as long as there is a bound on the number of collisions caused
and spoofed messages sent by each corrupted party.
In fact, an analogue of Claim 5.2.2 exists for the L2 metric (due to [BV05b,
Section VIII.]):
Claim 5.2.7 Assuming the L2 metric, no collisions, no address spoofing, and t <
0.23πr̃2, Bno collision achieves broadcast. In addition, there exists a constant T (depen-
dent on t, r̃) such that if the parties start executing Bno collision at time 0, all honest
parties in nbd2(Pd) output M by time T .
Moreover, the above holds even the adversary is given the following extra power:
when a faulty party Pi 6= Ps performs a multicast, the neighbors of Pi can receive
different messages, subject to the choice of the adversary.
Thus, applying the same transformation as outlined before, we obtain that:
Theorem 5.2.8 In the L2 metric, if t < 0.23πr̃
2 then there exists a protocol that
achieves broadcast as long as there is a bound on the number of collisions caused
and spoofed messages sent by each corrupted party.
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5.3 Impossibility Result
In this section, we present the lower bound result on the value of t when it is
impossible to achieve broadcast. The idea is to have the adversary corrupt a set of
parties that partitions the square grid into two halves, and act in a way such that
an honest party in one half cannot learn the messages broadcasted by a dealer in
the other half. Without loss of generality, we assume that the dealer is at (0, 0). We
remark that our impossibility result holds even if a corrupted party cannot cause
message collisions nor carry out message spoofing.
Theorem 5.3.1 If t ≥ 1
2
r̃(2r̃+1), it is impossible to achieve broadcast in L∞ metric,
even if a corrupted party cannot cause message collision nor carry out message
spoofing.
Proof We define two sets of parties S1 and S2 as follows:
• If r̃ is even, then
S1
def
= {(x, y) : 1 ≤ x ≤ r̃ ∧ x is odd}
S2
def
= {(x, y) : 1 ≤ x ≤ r̃ ∧ x is even}
• If r̃ is odd, then
S1
def
= {(x, y) : (1 ≤ x < r̃ ∧ x is odd)
∨(x = r̃ ∧ y is odd)}
S2
def
= {(x, y) : (1 ≤ x < r̃ ∧ x is even)





















Figure 5.1: Lower Bound in L∞ metric
Refer to Figure 5.1 for a pictorial representation of S1 and S2.
Note that no honest party P (x, y) (for x > r) can distinguish the following
two scenarios:
• Scenario 1:
– The dealer broadcasts a message m.
– The adversary corrupts all parties in S1 and all corrupted parties act as
if the dealer broadcasted the message m̄.
– All parties in S2 are honest.
• Scenario 2:
– The dealer broadcasts a message m̄.
– The adversary corrupts all parties in S2 and all corrupted parties act as
if the dealer broadcasted the message m.
– All parties in S1 are honest.
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The only thing left is to argue the adversary has corrupted at most 1
2
r̃(2r̃ +1)
neighbors of any honest party in both scenarios. But this is true since any party
not in S1(S2) has at most
1
2




In this dissertation, we have constructed round-efficient broadcast and secure
multiparty computation protocols in the point-to-point network and studied the
feasibility of broadcast in radio networks.
We have argued that if the ultimate goal is to optimize round complexity for
point-to-point networks, then it is preferable to focus on minimizing the number of
rounds in which broadcast is used rather than on minimizing the total number of
rounds. Towards this end, we have constructed constant-round secure multiparty
computation protocols that use only a single round of broadcast. The key to the
constructions is a new primitive that we introduce – moderated protocols. This new
primitive also allows us to construct the first expected constant-round authenticated
broadcast protocol for honest majority without any additional assumption.
We have initiated the study of broadcast in radio networks in the presence of
adversarial faults. We have purposed an adversarial model to model the corruptions
of parties in radio networks. Feasibility and impossibility results are present for the
L1-metric, and these results are tight under our adversarial model.
Some problems are left open by this dissertation, and we discuss these below:
Expected Constant-Round Broadcast Protocol for Dishonest Majority
We have shown the existence of an authenticated broadcast protocol for honest
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majority. However, it is of theoretical interest to determine if it is possible to achieve
broadcast in an expected constant number of rounds in the presence of dishonest
majority (i.e., more than half of the parties can be corrupted by the adversary).
Recently, some progress has been made towards resolving this question [GKKO],
but a complete answer is yet to be obtained.
Constant-Round Secure Multiparty Computation Protocol for Honest Majority Using
One Round of Broadcast
In this dissertation, we have given a constant-round secure MPC protocol for
honest majority using one round of broadcast assuming the existence of a public-key
infrastructure (PKI). This immediately gives a constant-round secure MPC protocol
using two rounds of broadcast without assuming a PKI (since a PKI can be setup
using one round of broadcast). It will be interesting to see if the number of rounds
of broadcast can be reduced from two to one.
Efficient Broadcast Protocol for Radio Networks
In our broadcast protocol, the communication overhead per each honest party
grows as Ω(t(nc + ns)) (recall that t is the maximum number of corrupted parties
in a neighborhood, nc and ns being the maximum number of collisions and address
spoofing caused by a corrupt party respectively). It is also to be noted that if
the adversary performs the maximum number of disruptive actions permitted, the
average cost of causing disruptions is Θ(nc + ns) per corrupted party. Thus, in our
protocol, honest parties are required to send more messages than corrupted parties
are assumed able to send!
One would desire a more communication-efficient broadcast protocol, or at
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least a protocol that requires honest parties to send out more messages only when the
corrupted parties send out more messages. Our protocols do not achieve this since
they are proactive, requiring parties to repeatedly send messages sufficiently-many
times to overcome any collisions (or instances of address spoofing) that may occur.
It would be of interest to determine whether a reactive protocol might perform




A.1 Multiparty computation protocol with round complex-
ity (O(1), O(1))
In below, we sketch the protocol due to Damg̊ard and Ishai[DI05] with em-
phasis on the part which requires interactions between parties. We refer the readers
to [DI05] for a complete protocol description and explanation. We assume the func-
tion to be computed is described as a Boolean circuit. Let W be the total number
of wires. And we number the wires from 0 to W -1.
Step 1 For each wire w = 0, . . . , W − 1,
- Party Pi shares a random bit λ
i
w by VSS. Let λw =
∑
λiw mod 2. A
party compute its share of λw.




2w+1 of length K by VSS (K being the
security parameter). Again, the sharing is done in a bit by bit manner.
For each input bit bw held by party Pj, Pj shares bw by VSS.
Step 2 • For each input wire w and i = 1, . . . , n, each server computes a share of
the value si2w+(bw⊕λw). Note that the value can be written as the following
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polynomial:
((1 + bw + λw) mod 2)s
i
2w + ((bw + λw) mod 2)s
i
2w+1
If si2w and s
i
2w+1 are shared in a bit by bit manner, then computing the
sharing of the value si2w+(bw⊕λw) can be reduced to computing the sharing
of K degree-2 polynomials over GF (2).
• For each wire w, the parties compute the shares of the value bw ⊕ λw.
• For each gate g in the circuit, suppose the two input wires are α and
β, the output wire is γ and the corresponding operator is ?. For each
















; δ11g = (λ̄α?λ̄β) ⊕ λγ
Note that the values can be written as degree 3 polynomials in the already
shared values.
Step 3 Let acdg = (a
cd,1
g , . . . , a
cd,n







party Pi computes a ciphertext (using the scheme described in [DI05]) based





Pi sends the following items to the parties who are supposed to receive the
outputs:
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• The shares of the polynomials it obtained in step 2.
• The ciphertexts it computed in the current step.
• If Pj is entitled to receive the value of output wire w, then Pi sends its
share of λw to Pj.
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